University of Central Florida

STARS
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2019

Comparative Analysis of the Relationship between State Security
and Ethnic Minority Oppression
Grayson Lanza
University of Central Florida

Part of the Political Science Commons

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information,
please contact STARS@ucf.edu.

STARS Citation
Lanza, Grayson, "Comparative Analysis of the Relationship between State Security and Ethnic Minority
Oppression" (2019). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 6349.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/6349

COMPARITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE SECURITY
AND ETHNIC MINORITY OPPRESSION

by

GRAYSON LANZA
B.A. University of Central Florida 2017

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the Department of Political Science
in the College of Sciences
at the University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida

Spring Term
2019

ABSTRACT
This research investigates the relationship between the state economic outlook, state security
apparatus and the presence of ethnic minority oppression within the state’s borders. Modern
states have developed extensive security apparatuses as they have developed their economies
and this research intended to identify the possibility of a connection between the development of
these aspects of the state in relation to ethnic minority repression. The research is broken up into
a research design and introductory section, a case study section, and a final analysis and
conclusion section. Each of the four case studies studied a and ethnic minority relationship, and
in total there were three states and four ethnic minorities researched.
The research analyzed four studies and studied relationships between the economic outlook of
the state, its security outlook, cultural issues, and how these relate to ethnic minority oppression.
The findings of the study indicate some degree of relationship between all the aforementioned
variables. The study suggests that the relationship between the state security apparatus and ethnic
minority oppression is second to that of a state’s economic outlook and ethnic minority
oppression and that the security outlook of a state is not an alternative explanation for state
repression.
Future research questions recommended suggestions are predicated off the results of this
research that showed the primacy of state economic outlook. It is recommended for further
research into the spatial relationship between ethnic minorities and the productive forces of
states, if and how colonial theories can be applied to states that are not settler-colonial in their
foundation in relation to ethnic minorities, and how state security apparatuses have developed
and how they interact with ethnic minorities.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The conceptualization of an ethnic minority as an entity is relatively recent in human history.
Prior the Treaty of Westphalia, governing entities were often run and ruled by elites that shared
little to no cultural similarity with the various populations that fell under their rule. Over time, as
the concept of a “nation-state” coalesced, elites began to dictate cultural norms like language
downwards. In many instances, this meant the wiping out of many regional dialects and smaller
languages. It also meant that larger groups that could not be assimilated so easily and had a
distinct culture of their own were now ruled by another such group. Essentially, ethnic minorities
were borne out of the creation of states. Even in states that had never placed much emphasis on
the delineation of cultures in an official sense would be affected by this, as worldwide entire
political systems were built around ethnic identity. The development of state security, itself
likely an even younger concept then ethnic minorities, was early on set for a crash cross in hamfisted interactions with ethnic minorities. Throughout the 20th and 21st century, state-minority
conflicts have often dominated headlines. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, brutal warfare
broke out between Chechen separatists and the Russian military. As Turkey formed out of the
carcass of the Ottoman Empire, it was quickly beset by dissatisfaction and resistance by a
Kurdish population that found itself in newfound borders. After several decades of warfare and
instability, the People’s Republic of China finally managed to govern the historic China. Despite
their quickly found authority, resident Uyghurs to the West quickly chafed under their rule. Yet
the Miao, a group known to prior Chinese governing entities as practically ungovernable, have
lived peacefully under the PRC. Many states justify billions of dollars of their budgets off the
need for security, often with vague allusions to outside threats. In some, such as in China,
Russia, and Turkey, those security threats are seen domestically, arising out of native minority
1

populations. All three of these states have pursued intensive economic plans in the past few
decades and all three have utilized their security apparatuses against minority populations that
reside within them as they have pursued economic development.
Significance of the Research
This research bares significance due the prevalence of minority rights suppression across the
world regardless of state government, culture, or level of economic activity. Understanding why
the state sees a benefit to ostracizing an entire resident population rather than integrating them is
a question worth answering. Most, if not all, of the ethnic minorities that will be analyzed in this
research will have lived in the existing states for a significant portion of their existence.
Ethnic minorities tend to be the worst performing groups economically, politically, and
educationally. This is the case in an overwhelming amount of multi-ethnic states, with the
exceptions tending to be post-colonial states where a minority group was installed into power by
the former colonial power. Despite most of the world participating in the global, liberal
economic order, the socio-political situation of minorities throughout the globe has fluctuated
and there is little case to be made that there has been relative improvement. The topic deserves
further interest due to the massive expansion of the state security apparatuses of much of the
world’s regional and global powers due to the War on Terrorism and the reigning neoliberal
economic order. The impact of the globally more prevalent security state on long-standing
tensions between a state and minority population has relevance in helping scholars better
contextualize the security situation in area of significance throughout the world. Considering the
expansion of developmental efforts, how states utilize their security apparatuses in relation to
their economic interests is important research.
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Research Design
In all, there will be a total of eight chapters. There will be an introductory chapter, which will lay
out the basics of analysis (research design) and discussion on events occurring at the time of the
writing that are relevant to the research. Following the introduction there will is a chapter
dedicated to a literature review and then a chapter for the theoretical argument. There will be
then be four case studies, with each case study one chapter dedicated to the analysis of a specific
state and minority within that state. The three states and the four minorities that will be analyzed
are China and the Uyghurs, Russia and the Chechens, Turkey and the Kurds, and China and the
Miao. The three states that are to be studied were picked because all three are either
contemporarily officially multi-ethnic states or they are continuations of multi-ethnic governing
entities. Both China and Russia formally consider themselves to be multi-ethnic societies and
constitutionally recognize this as much to varying degrees. Turkey, which tends to attempt to
identify itself as a nation-state for the Turkish people on and off throughout its history, is the
official successor state to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. The minorities that were selected all
meet their own set of criteria. All four are ethnic minorities within a state but are native to
regions within said states borders, all four are ethnic minorities, all four have been involved in
varying degrees of violence with their respective states, and all four live on the border of their
respective states.
Each case study will be broken up into four to five sections, with three of the sections
specifically for analysis of the proposed variables. A history section that gives an overview of
state security and minority interactions up until the contemporary period. A section will be
dedicated to analyzing the economic outlook of the state (the independent variable), including
how the state perceives the minority group from this perspective and how the minority group
3

interacts with the state-security apparatus. The predominate economic industry that will be
discussed is that of the state’s energy sector. There will be a section on the security outlook of
the state (the alternative explanation), which will include how the minority is considered with the
security situation of the minority and the overall security climate within the state. Border security
will be the predominate form of security analyzed. Another section will be focused on potential
interceding variables, specifically outside state involvement with the minority population and
antagonism toward a state’s security and the intercultural divides that exist within the analyzed
state. The final section for the case study chapters will be a detailing the results of the analysis.
The final chapter will be the conclusion which will include a summary of the case study results,
whether the hypothesis will be rejected, analysis of the results in relation to the hypothesis, and
recommendations for future research.
Alternative Explanation: Security outlook of the state
The security outlook of the state will be inferred from the research itself. It is unlikely in the
modern day for states to identify a minority as a security threat as this would be openly racist.
Instead, a security outlook of the state will be how it utilizes its military and/or police forces in
the regions these minorities predominately live in, what their functional rights are relative to the
rest of the state’s population, and the state’s anti-terrorism initiatives. The predominant analysis
of state security outlook will be that of the state’s border security measures, as all four ethnic
minorities live in border regions. The purpose of including an alternative explanation in this
research is to make prominent the effect of the state security outlook on both the dependent and
independent variables. While it is not assumed that the security outlook of a state is alternative to
the economic outlook as to what causes the state oppression of minorities, the utilization of the
state security apparatus as a method of oppression on ethnic minorities makes it apparent that
4

there is an effect on our dependent and independent variables because of its importance in the
relationship. It should be emphasized that while the security outlook of the state is a potential
other explanation for the repression of ethnic minorities it is not considered a predominant reason
for this and the results of the research shall indicate as much.
Independent Variable: Economic outlook of the state
The economic outlook of the state will be considered the state’s official economic policies, how
well its economy has been doing contemporarily, and the minority population’s relative
economic success. The economic outlook of the state will be specifically analyzed in relation to
their energy industry. As the independent variable, the economic outlook of states is considered
the main cause and explanation for ethnic minority repression in our case studies and its
relationship with other variables will be defined by its affect upon them.
Dependent Variable: Relative rights status of the minority population
Every state in the world has different legal systems and it is unfair to set a generalized standard
researching these states. Instead, the rights of the minority populations will be considered
relative to those of the predominant ethnicity in their respective states. Minority education and
economic attainment relative to the rest of state’s will also be considered in evaluating this
variable.
Interceding Variables:
Outside state involvement
Cultural divides
Outside state involvement will be considered any level of involvement of an outside state with
another state’s resident minority population. This could include anything from verbal support of
a minority to the funding, training, and facilitation of minority separatist groups. Cultural divides
5

will be considered distinctions between the majority ethnic group in the state and the minority
ethnicity. This can/will include language differences, cultural practices, religion, and way-of-life.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In China's Policy Towards Uyghur Nationalism’s, author Eric Hyer analyzes the Chinese state’s
policy toward Uyghur nationalism in the context of collapse of the Soviet Union and the
development of the Central Asian states. Hyer relates China’s economic plan and its energy
needs to its security policies toward the Uyghurs. Although this article was written 12 years ago
and three years prior to the 2009 Ürümqi riots, it is remarkably prescient about the urgency the
Chinese state will treat its security concerns in the region with. The article does center the issue
around Uyghur nationalism and Chinese state policies as being a reaction to it, which may
overlook the origin of Uyghur nationalism.
Evan McKinney wrote China's Muslims Separatism and Prospects for Ethnic Peace to compare
the differing situations of the two most prominent Muslim minorities in China, the Uyghurs and
Hui. McKinney discusses the security situation and the Chinese state’s prospects for that but
focuses predominantly on the ability for the Hui to conform to Chinese state policy unlike the
Uyghurs. The article is mostly identity oriented, looking to situate the two groups in relation to
their perception of their identity and its place within Chinese society.
Author Michael Clarke has the most written on the subject of Uyghurs, spanning several years of
research. His article China's Internal Security Dilemma and the "Great Western Development”
takes the stance that China’s security efforts are explicitly in an effort to protect the dominant
Han majority group. This comes at the expense of minorities, particularly the Uyghurs as China
views them as a source of potential terrorism and violence. The economic issues of the Uyghurs,
among other minorities, is also discussed in relation to the tensions between the PRC and the
Uyghurs. While Xinjiang is shown to have become a rapidly developing transit and resource hub
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for China and neighboring Caspian states, the native Uyghurs in the region have seen little to no
benefit from these economic gains.
In The Decline and Shifting Geography of Violence in Russia’s North Caucasus by Edward
Holland, a spatial analysis on violence in the North Caucasus between 2010 and 2016 is
performed. Holland analyses data that suggests that violence in the region has declined although
it has spread out from Chechnya. The 2014 Sochi Olympics is noted as a large contributor to this
change, as Russia switched to a policy of securitization in the region and moved away from
economic based incentives. This article provides a good overview of the North Caucuses as a
whole, with a focus on Chechnya that makes it particularly relevant to this research. Holland is
careful to discuss not only the potential causes of the drops in violence but the differences in
policies used over time in the region.
From 1994 to 2000, Chechyna was the site of two brutal wars as Chechen separatist groups
fought the Russian military. Marat Iliyasov analyses the potential impact of these conflicts and
their resulting outcomes on Chechen ethnic identity in Chechen ethnic identity: assessing the
shift from resistance to submission. Iliyasov surveys the Chechen attitude toward Russian state
authority and the level of resistance that Chechen militias still provide. The article provides an
interesting insight into the Chechen identity, especially in relation to the Russian state’s security
apparatus. Iliyasov does well to present the Chechen ethnic identity and identify any potential
changes it has had considering the change in community behavior, however it is apparent that he
has an affinity for the Chechen’s and some of that bias bleeds into the work. Regardless, the
article stands out as one of the most explicit analyses of ethnic identity and the security state.
Tod Reed and Diana Raschke provide an analysis on a specific group dedicated to Uyghur
separatism in their book The Etim: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat:
8

China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. While less focused on the relationship
between the Chinese state and the Uyghur, this source provides an important understanding of
the motivations and ideology of the most prominent Uyghur separatist group, ETIM. Reed and
Rascke discuss the development of ETIM, its ideological underpinnings, and the efforts it has
made against the central Chinese state. While ETIM may not be representative of the sentiment
of all Uyghurs, it could be viewed as one form of an expression of the feelings the Uyghurs have
towards their socio-political situation in China, analogous to the IRA in Northern Ireland and
Hamas in Palestine.
Kurdish resistance groups in Turkey have often gone defunct, split, or evolved. Seevan Saeed
analyzes the latest development in the organizing of Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state in
Kurdish politics in Turkey: from the PKK to the KCK. While the book is for the most part
informational on the status and structure of contemporary Kurdish organizations in Turkey, its
ascribing of the Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) as a social-movement rather than a militia or
political party. Saeed takes an identity-focused angle in his analysis of the organization and what
exactly is entailed by a social movement. How the Turkish state-security apparatus has reacted to
the KCK is discussed in a limited manner, too. Due to the unstable nature of minority resistance
movements due to state pressures, Saeed’s book is helpful in giving some of the most recent
analysis of what is happening in Kurdish populated Turkey now.
The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are not alone in the oppressive state policies toward them within China,
with Tibetans similarly being faced with restrictive policies toward them. These two regions and
their people are compared in Jungmin Seo and Young Chul Cho’s article Rethinking Beijing's
Geostrategic Sensibilities to Tibet and Xinjiang: Images and Interests compares China’s differing
understanding of the two regions. The authors suggest that energy security is the primary driver
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behind Chinese policies in Xinjiang. China’s ever-so-fast economic development requires fuel,
much of which flows through pipelines that cross the far-Western province. The article raises the
interesting question of how prominent the role of the prevailing economic situation is on the
Chinese security outlook.
In Elena Zhirukhina’s Protecting the state: Russian repressive tactics in the North Caucasus, the
Russian state security apparatus is scrutinized. Specifically, Zhirukhina analyzes the tactics
Russia developed over the course of two decades of dealing with Chechen insurgencies. Much of
the article is focused on the changes that the Russian security agencies took in their development
to address the insurgency, such as a focus on preventative operations. Zhirukhina finds that the
Russian state has become more selective in its use of violence, however it still uses repressive
policies toward the Chechen population. This article provides a detailed security perspective of
the Russian state which is one of the main variables to be analyzed.
Michael Clarke writes again on the subject of the Uyghurs, comparing the developing situation
of them to Palestinians in China and the Uyghurs: The 'Palestinization' of Xinjiang? Despite
being obviously far away from each other and culturally distinct, the policies of isolation,
economic limitation, and displacement are both featured prominently in the Israeli treatment of
Palestinians and Chinese treatment of Uyghurs. Under the guise of security concerns, both Israel
and China seek to assert their economic and social control over territory for preservation of state
aims. The utilization of both Palestinians and Uyghurs in state economic projects in conjunction
with increasing the securitization of their spaces is discussed in depth in this article. Clarke
provides an excellent addition to the literature on Uyghurs through this comparison and to the
body of work on state security and minority relations.
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An article that directly addresses the question of Uyghurs and Chinese state security is by Kilic
Bugra Kanat, who wrote The Securitization of the Uyghur Question and Its Challenges. This
article addresses directly what the securitization of the Uyghur within China and the tensions it
has caused between the Chinese state and the Uyghur population. Kanat is one of the few sources
that suggests that the Chinese state policy towards the Uyghur is a contributing factor to the
tensions and Uyghur alienation, recommending that the state changes its policies.
The return of Michael Clarke is rounded off in his work The Impact of Ethnic Minorities on
China’s Foreign Policy, which examines the role China’s ethnic minorities play in its foreign
policy. The Uyghurs are used as a case study, and building upon his prior works, they are viewed
as part of a security issue that the state must combat through domestic security policies and
relation with Central Asian states. Clarke takes a more research design-oriented take to this topic,
utilizing five different aspects of the Uyghur-China situation in relation to its impact on Chinese
foreign policy.
In Fevzi Bilgin and Ali Sarıhan’s book Understanding Turkey's Kurdish question, the history and
development of the Kurdish separatist movement within Turkey is analyzed. Kurdish resistance
to Turkey began at the outset of the establishment of Turkey in the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.
While initially based off Islamic resistance to the new secular state, the Kurdish ethnic identity
over time became progressively solid and the separatist movements diverged from religious
inspiration. The book is primarily a historical overview of the different stages of Kurdish
resistance to the Turkish state and the Turkish state’s reaction to it. Overall, it is mostly
informational and does not provide any grand analysis of the relationship between the state and
the Kurds. Despite the vaguely dark allusion made in the title, the book is mostly focused on
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detailing the situation for the Turkish state in relation to the Kurds. It still provides helpful
background to analysis of the Turkish security outlook and the Kurds.
Meil Ding provides an anthropological perspective on Chinese state security policies in relation
to the Uyghur populace in Security Matters in Marriage: Uyghurs’ Perceptions of Security in
Xinjiang, China. The “securitization” of daily life for Uyghurs is observed through Uyghur
marriages, with what makes a couple appropriate for marriage dependent on additional, security
driven matters. The article provides perspective of the impact of state security on minority
culture. While not a political science article, Ding’s work is important to contextualize and
humanize the issues facing the Uyghurs. More than merely another community with issues with
extremism, the humanization of the Uyghurs also works to better understand the impact of
Chinese policies.
Perhaps as a result of the simply long length of time that organized resistance from the Kurds to
the Turkish state, the state of Kurdish interactions with the state is likely the most advanced of
any minority group in a parallel situation. Cengiz Gunes analyzes this development in his book,
The Kurdish national movement in Turkey: from protest to resistance. After decades of on-andoff clashes between Kurdish communities and the Turkish military, resistance coalesced around
the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), originally a Marxist-Leninist liberation party. Gunes
analyzes how the PKK went from a fringe group to one of the primary targets of the Turkish
security apparatus. Support and opposition for the Kurdish community for the PKK and how that
itself is developed is discussed by Gunes within the book. The book is an in-depth dive into the
Kurdish identity of resistance and how it was expressed in relation to the Turkish state. A major
contributor to the literature on state-minority relationships in a security context.
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Since Mao secured control over China and drove the remnants of the Nationalist military forces
off the mainland into Taiwan, the CCP has grappled with how to handle the Uyghur population
which has generally never been interested in Chinese assimilationist policies. Ondřej Klimeš
analyzes the relationship of the Chinese state and the Uyghurs since 1949. He also does
contextualize the policies introduced against the Uyghurs since 2012 as being specific to Xi’s
leadership, connecting the policy to ideology. While my research will be focused primarily on
security and economic outlooks, ideological underpinnings of the state impact both and is
important to include in my analysis.
In S. Fogden’s Writing Insecurity: The PRC's Push to Modernize China and the Politics of
Uyghur Identity, the Chinese state’s urge to “modernize” the country has often come into
conflict with the Uyghurs populace due to the state’s views on what exactly modernization
entails. Modernization is often a charged term because “modernity” is most often understood as
the aims of the presiding power of a population, not necessarily what is in the best interests of it.
Despite decades of Chinese assimilation policy, the Uyghurs have mostly resisted the project.
Understanding their motivation, and the Chinese state’s motivation, is paramount to give a
historical contextualization to my research.
Security issues are preeminent in the Chinese state’s concerns over Uyghur nationalist tendencies
and their Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. In The evolving terrorist threat to China’s Central
Asia projects, Federica Reccia describes China’s urgency in grappling with the Uyghur unrest,
particularly the attacks by the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), on their rail lines connecting China
to the western Central Asian states through the region. The most revealing aspect of the situation
is just how many people have been claimed to have been killed so far, with a death toll of 468
between 2010 and 2014. Reccia’s analysis of the security situation heavily incorporates the
13

economic concerns of China; mineral and energy resources coming from the west are critical for
China’s continued economic growth. However, the Uyghur’s are not discussed as much more
than antagonists to China’s economic aspirations and need to ensure citizenry security, with no
attempt made to delve into the motivations of the Uyghurs and what is facilitating the violence.
Like much of the existing literature, the focus of this article is from the perspective of the
Chinese state’s security outlook.
One of the pre-eminent scholars on inequality, Charles Tilly’s Durable Inequality examines how
inequalities in society, ranging from gender to minorities, are “durable” through time and laws.
Tilly introduces his four-part causes of inequality, exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation,
and adaptation. Within Durable Inequality there is discussion on the nation building predicated
off international norms, which in turn institutionalizes what is a “citizen”. Tilly manages to
develop a framework of analysis for inequality in relationships, a framework that is essential to
analyzing the relationships of states and their minority populations. The development of the
concept of “transactional costs” in relation to the relationship between two entities gives framing
for the continued oppression of minorities within my case studies that my research is analyzing.
Durable Inequality provides a strong theoretical foundation to the research to be done in this
paper.
The progenitor of intra-state conflict, Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel, analyzes and discusses at
length about the reasons why rebellions occur. Gurr discusses emotive, psychological, nonrational causes of political violence and the underlying reasons that in trigger rebellions. One of
the most important concepts that Gurr develops is relative deprivation. Relative deprivation
defined in Why Men Rebel as an actor’s perception of their situation and what they believe their
situation could possibly be. One of the most relevant aspects of Gurr’s work is his discussion
14

state capability to respond to rebellions. In all four case studies to be analyzed there have been
significant rebellions by the ethnic minority against the state at some point in history. Gurr’s
work provides a framework to explain in part that ethnic minorities understanding of their
tension with their respective central states.
In Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde’s book Security: A New Framework for
Analysis, as the title is explicit about, a comprehensive framework for analyzing security issues
is built out. The authors discuss the concepts of sectoral analysis and securitization, the latter of
which is an important concept to the research in this paper. Securitization, the concept that states
will craft different subjects into issues of security for ulterior purposes. Wæver’s development of
securitization is immediately applicable to the interactions of the central state with three of the
ethnic minority case studies present in this research. An important aspect of securitization that is
discussed at length in Security: A New Framework for Analysis are the reasons that a state will
“securitize” an issue, which is examined within this research as to why state’s view certain ethnic
minorities within their borders as a security issue.
In Donald Horowitz’s work Ethnic Groups in Conflict he tackles how ethnic groups operate
within conflict. One of the most important contribution Horowitz makes is his analysis of
conflict theory through the perspective of ethnic groups instead of the internationalist bent it
typical had at the time of his writing. Who, why, and how ethnic groups get involved in conflicts
are discussed with comparative case studies. One of the aspects of ethnic conflict that Horowitz
touches on is the varying economic reasons that ethnically based conflicts occur. While he does
not go into depth on state antagonism of ethnic groups, his work provides theoretical grounding
for ethnic conflict that is predicated from questions of status and to a lesser extent economic
issues. His analysis of modernization theories and how they relate to ethnic conflict much of the
15

discussion revolves around class distinctions within ethnic groups and what role they have,
indicative of the role status plays in minority community outlook and how economic topics relate
to these questions of status.
The security outlooks of states have a significant role in this research as a variable that affects
both our independent and dependent variables. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever discuss the
differing regional security frameworks that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union
in Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Buzan and Waever propose the
Regional Security Complex Theory, which proposes that there are specific regional security
complexes defined by the states have a high amount of interactions amongst themselves. Within
this research all three states that are analyzed either border each other or are relatively close,
however according to the theory they are all three in different RSC’s. RSC theory does provide
some background to the security outlooks of the three states analyzed and suggests that these
states should have different security needs and/or wants for their states.
Nationalism is inevitably associated with ethnic conflict and minority ethnic-state tensions, and
for good reason. Benedict Anderson discusses how ethnic groups begin to perceive themselves
and how they form identities in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Anderson proposes the concept of “horizontal comradeship”, which is how
members of an ethnic group that may not have ever met each other can associate and empathize
with each other’s condition. In the discussion of minority ethnic group tensions with the state’s
that they inhabit, this horizontal comradeship surely plays a role in the grievances that the ethnic
groups discussed in this research have with their respective states. This theory of ethnic group
identification is relevant to the research in numerous ways, particularly in the observations of
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cultural norms and how they interact with state economic programs and the state security
apparatus.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL
With the fall of the Soviet Union and 9/11 in the United States, the world’s powers have moved
quickly to expand state security apparatuses ostensibly for the protection of their citizens.
Whether the world is a safer place today is dependent on one’s perspective and where they fall
within their country’s hierarchy and where they fall within the economic plans of the state. The
fall of the Soviet Union and transition to the Russian Federation was almost immediately beset
by intense resistance, and the breakout of outright war, by ethnic Chechens in Chechnya who
sought independence (Sanz, 2017). In China, Uyghur resistance to Chinese state policy has
boiled over several times in the past few decades into riots and an Islamist Uyghur independence
armed group has gained notoriety (Clarke, 2015). The Miao in China have a long history of
violent uprisings against Chinese government, and to this day have a relatively poor socioeconomic standing in China (McCord, 2011). Turkey’s ongoing issues with its Kurdish
population have been a running theme of its existence since the Ottoman Empire fell (Gunes,
2011). All four-minority population held relatively less power and economic wealth compared to
the predominate ethnic groups in their respective states, however as these state security
apparatuses have expanded, there appears to be a trend of furthered state repression and
worsened socio-political outcomes for minorities where this significant economic interest for the
state. That is why this research proposes the following hypothesis for its basis: If a state’s
government views an ethnic minority as a potential threat to an important economic industry,
then the state will utilize the security apparatus to repress the ethnic minority.
Tensions between minority populations and their ruling governments are not a new occurrence in
human history. Jewish and Roman tensions that often spilled over into intense periods of
repression are well documented despite occurring thousands of years ago. However, the
18

dynamics of these tensions have likely changed in the time since then. In the age of empires,
without strong centralized bureaucracies or a national character, minority oppression was
predominately about limiting political rights and perhaps a special tax. The Ottoman Empire, the
last of the old imperial regimes common from the 15th century onward, was very ethnically
diverse. Composed of Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Bulgarians and other
Slavic cultures, the Ottomans tended to be relatively fair to their minority subjects (IsomVerhaaren and Schull, 2016). Outside of the jizya (tax) levied on non-Muslim peoples, there was
little state antagonism toward minority populations. China, one of the oldest continuous existing
countries in the world despite dozens of iterations, was for the most part a multi-ethnic, multilingual country. Two of the last ruling Imperial dynasties, the Yuan and Qing, were both founded
and ruled by not only minority populations but minority populations that were not originally
subject to Chinese rule (Zhang 2018)(Anert, 2013). The direct conflicts between a minority
population and its central government that has become more conflict is a result of the formation
of states as the primary mode of governance in world. In this research, the state will be the level
of focus.
St ate security is a similarly newer concept in world history. Governing entities rarely had
professionalized, large, standing militaries throughout human history. Even a formal police force
was not the norm. Today, nearly every state on earth maintains a professionalized standing
military. As communication technology has developed and diversified, domestic security forces
have increasingly been grown to secure state interests. The modern security state has no
significant precedent, due in part to technological advances and the centralization of government
functions in the state structure. How the security state interacts, and views, minority populations
is a relatively recent consideration to be made by scholars. Due to being more recently developed
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and its importance in modern state structure, the security outlook of the state is the alternative
explanation. As proposed in the hypothesis, a state’s security outlook will be the effective tool
the state uses to justify and carry out the oppression of ethnic minority populations. However,
there is potential for the states to have some justifiable security concerns regarding ethnic
minorities. State security outlook is typically the tool of the state to enforce the economic order,
but to some extent the security apparatus of the state exists outside of this relationship and effects
minority oppression and the state’s economic outlook. This potential effect on both the
independent and dependent variable is why it is an alternative explanation. As a result of this
potential effect, it will be considered an alternative explanation to the repression of ethnic
minorities. Minority populations, who for the most already had an inequal relationship with the
state, have these inequalities enhanced in their limited ability to respond or influence the state
security apparatus (Tilly, 1998). In their limited capacity, minority populations clearly fit the
dependent variable role.
Naturally, there are variables that play a more significant role in the resulting outcomes of the
state-minority relationship. That is why the economic outlook of the state is considered the
independent variable. It is unlikely that state security apparatuses exist as an essential aspect of
the state structure, and it is often argued that state security is built up in response to threats to the
state itself. While the state security apparatus can possibly have an effect and will be considered
an alternative explanation for state repression of ethnic minorities, the economic outlook of states
is considered the progenitor of minority oppression in this research. What and how these threats
are perceived to be plays a significant role in state security policies. Why the security state, and
the threats that it is supposedly addressing, exist in the first place will be explored in this
research, and it will be presupposed that the economic outlook of the state is the reason as it is
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most likely the biggest security threat to a modern state. Ethnic minorities are then securitized
due to the state fearing a threat to its economic situation, particularly threats to their energy
industry. Traditional warfare is gone for the most part, and most wars of the past two decades
have been asymmetric or civil wars. Protecting the state’s economic interests, a major part of any
state’s legitimacy, is a strong potential reason for the build out of the security state and in turn
could glean why states interact with their minority populations with a security perspective.
Therefore, a state’s economic outlook plays a role in relationship of the state and minority
populations.
There are factors that are to be considered interceding variables in this research. These variables
function outside of the state itself, whether it is another state or cultures/diasporas that interact
with a minority population. States, specifically nation states, that share cultural affinities with a
minority group or stand to benefit from ethnic tensions in another state may lend support to
minority groups seeking independence. In the many ethnically driven wars in the Balkans
throughout the 1990’s, states like Croatia, Serbia, and Albania would support militias that shared
their identity in civil conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In some cases, a state itself may not
involve itself but its own public may support separatist movements in other countries. In the
United States, Irish-American communities often provided notable amounts of material support,
be it money or weapons, the Irish Republican Army and its campaign against the Irish Partition
despite their being little material impact either way for them in the outcome of the conflict
(Wilson, 1995). Both interceding variables are identity based, an identity as a factor in stateminority relationships cannot be ignored.
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CHAPTER 4: CHINA AND THE UYGHURS

Introduction
In 2009, riots broke out in the western Chinese city of Ürümqi. Located in Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region, the farthest northwestern province in the People’s Republic of China, the
riots were neither the first nor the last of the social unrest that had faced the region. Xinjiang is
predominately populated by the Uyghur people, a Turkic group that are for the most part identify
as Muslims. Long living in the periphery of Chinese society and chafing under strict state
controls, unrest has been an issue in Xinjiang. That is why this paper hypothesizes that if the
Chinese government views the Uyghur population as a security issue, then it will maintain
policies that limit Uyghur political access to the state. Other variables to consider include outside
state interference, such as funding for separatist groups or public agitation, and cultural divides
driven by ethnic tension.
The 2009 Ürümqi riots were unique. For the first time in contemporary Chinese history, the
dissatisfaction of the Uyghur populace was in international news as the full weight of the
Chinese state security apparatus cracked down. Tensions that had been kept under the wrap of
state censorship and the general remoteness of Xinjiang were on full display, with Western
media happily attaching the situation in Xinjiang to the unrest seen in Tibet, one of the highlights
of 2008. While Tibetans and Uyghurs both are long suffering minorities in the PRC and face
similar issues, why they face them is not particularly similar. Somewhat naïve headlines
scattered across Western media, questioning the “Chinese unraveling” driven by minority unrest.
While these articles were jumping the gun, there are real state legitimacy issues at stake.
Xinjiang, bereft of typical economic drivers like arable land and manufacturing, finds its
22

economy driven instead by resource extraction and location. It is home to natural gas and mineral
deposits that help fuel the Chinese economy. It also borders seven different countries, Russia,
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Krygystan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Several of these
bordering countries are important to Chinese transit endeavors part of its broad economic policy
of “Belt Road Initiative”, seeking to establish Chinese influence abroad. Countries like
Kazakhstan have been enthusiastic receptors of Chinese investment. Xinjiang is home to a
majority population of Uyghur’s; however, Han Chinese make up a significant portion of the
population too. Unlike the Uyghurs, the Xinjiang Han are typically economically ascendant and
for the most part left alone by the government. This paper will explore why the Uyghurs are
considered a security threat by the Chinese government, and how the securitization of the
Uyghur’s affects their rights and privileges within Chinese society.
History
There is some irony about the PRC’s treatment of the Uyghur’s. Hundreds of years ago, Turkic
nomadic groups that eventually would become the Uyghur were purposely settled in what is now
Xinjiang after the Qing Empire’s genocide of the Dzungar people in the 18th century (Guo,
2015). The Dzungar people and the Dzungar Khanate were led by Mongol Buddhists that had
long inhabited the region (Klimeš, 2012). The Qing’s campaign of conquest against the Khanate
led to the region’s depopulation, which the Qing resolved by settling the nomadic Turkic groups
that would later become known as Uyghurs and Han (Guo, 2015). At this time, the Muslim
Uyghurs were considered far more trustworthy by the Qing. Approximately 150 years later in the
beginning years of the PRC, surveys of the Xinjiang province showed it to be overwhelmingly
populated by Uyghurs. For the most part, the PRC had little economic investment and
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involvement in the region, making the already isolated region even less accessible (Castets,
2003). With the loosening of economic controls and shift in policy country wide, similar changes
took place in Xinjiang. The increased development of the region also meant that the Han began
to move to it, taking up residence predominately in cities, mostly Ürümqi. The first notable
incidence of civil unrest in Xinjiang came in 1990 in what would be called the “Barren riot”
(Guo, 2015). Approximately 200 Uyghur men, members of the recently established East
Turkistan Islamic Party, protested outside of the local PRC office against the supposed forced
abortions that Uyghur women were forced to undergo and the mass migration of the Han into
Xinjiang that was displacing the local Uyghur’s (Castets, 2003). The PLA quickly sent out to the
town and put down the protest, with many members of the group arrested and sentenced to death
(Guo, 2015). Just across the Western border, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation
of several new Central Asian states, many of which having close cultural connections to the
Uyghurs and perhaps inspiring the renewed interest in independence.
In the ensuing decades, sporadic protests and violence was met with consistent shows of strength
by the PRC and little change in the direction of the province. The 2009 Ürümqi riots by local
Uyghur’s were sparked in part by the attacks on Uyghur workers in Guangdong by the local Han
population over claims of sexual assault (Castets, 2003). Dissatisfaction with state treatment and
poor economic prospects were drivers of the initial protests, as the workers themselves were
transported from Xinjiang to Guangdong to work in the factories to make up for labor shortages
in the region. Several days of protests, both by Uyghurs and the Han populations of the city,
were cut off from the outside world with the near instantaneous cessation of internet and radio
access by the state (Guo, 2015). Ürümqi marked a turning point for Uyghur-PRC interactions, as
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the Chinese state has since rapidly expanded the scope and scale of its security apparatus in the
province and conflict has become more frequent. At the time of this writing, there are reports that
the PRC has been sending tens of thousands of Uyghurs to “re-education” centers (Wong, 2017).
Movement of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, already limited, is now completely restricted and
communication difficult. Many Uyghurs had sought work in outside provinces have been
allegedly taken and sent back to Xinjiang (Wong, 2017). The escalation in securitization has
made the question of state security and Uyghur relations with the state a more pressing question
to broach.
Chinese Security Policy and Outlook
Xinjiang has become the highest security priority of the PRC. Dramatically scaling up the
presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and police forces in 2018, the Xinjiang
province is controlled more tightly than Tibet has ever been. Communication is incredibly
limited both within the province and those trying to contact family and friends within it. Travel
to the province for non-citizens has ceased for the most part (Wong, 2017). These actions, which
has caught little traction among international media outlets, are not generalizable for the entire
population, however. Xinjiang’s large Han population is not experiencing the upscale of state
presence in the way the Uyghur population has, which is reportedly being sent to large scale
camps for “education”. While there has been little to no acknowledgement of these actions by the
PRC elite, in the past the justification for security-based moves against the Uyghurs has been
justified by the typical line of preserving state harmony. The Uyghurs pose a security issue to the
government, and what this means for the Uyghurs and the PRC is important to understanding the
security outlook of China is.
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The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), the newest iteration of what has long been referred to as the
East Turkistan Islamic Party, tends to capture the focus of security justification for the PRC both
by the state and by many authors in who have written on this topic. For good reason, too, as what
is now called TIP is considered a terrorist organization by not only China, but prominently the
European Union, the US, and Russia (Clarke, 2015). With connections al-Qaeda and ISIS, TIP
has been involved not only in militant agitation within Xinjiang but also as far away as Syria and
Vietnam. Terrorist attacks in Xinjiang have increased in frequency since the 2009 riots. TIP is
far from a new organization, with its oldest predecessor founded in the late 1980’s and existing
since then to varying degrees of activity (Reed and Raschke, 2010). TIP’s attacks are often
focused on government administrative centers, such as a party office in town or a security
checkpoint (Reed, 2010). While TIP is an ostensibly Islamist organization, it has little to no
following or interaction with other native Chinese Muslim populations, like the Hui. The
division between the Uyghur and other Chinese Muslim populations belays an important point
that will be explored in depth later. TIP is for the most part composed of ethnic Uyghurs from
Xinjiang or the Uyghur diaspora (Reed and Raschke, 2010). Its main goal is for the
independence of Xinjiang and the establishment of a caliphate in the region. Despite the
universalizing nature of Islam, TIP is notably focused on the plight of Uyghurs and other Turkic
peoples under the banner of Islam rather than the more general aims of ISIS, which sought to
establish a state for all Muslim people’s regardless of ethnicity (Reed and Raschke, 2010). TIP is
the primary agitator against the Chinese state, and in turn receives the brunt of its security
apparatus. While TIP is a genuine threat and its attacks are not justifiable, the organizations
existence alone is not satisfactory enough to justify to securitization of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang
as a whole. There is little evidence to suggest that TIP enjoys widespread support among the
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Uyghur population, and abroad its branches are mostly filled by Uyghurs who reside in Turkey
or Central Asian states (Clarke, 2011).
Under the PRC, China has long been concerned with its territorial integrity. From the outset this
was an issue due to the de facto independence of Taiwan under its vanquished Nationalist foes.
In the immediate aftermath of the chaos of the Chinese Civil War, the PRC worked to secure
much of the borders that composed of the fallen Qing Empire, with the PLA entering Inner
Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. While the Han, who are often regarded as “Chinese” by those
outside of the country, make up most of the population, over 300 million Chinese citizens come
from at least one of the 52 constitutionally recognized minorities in the PRC (Lilly, 2009). China
has long viewed itself as a multi-ethnic state, and the formal recognition within the country’s
institutions indicates as much (Lilly, 2009). However, like countries like the United States and
Russia, how these institutions function regarding the minority populations often diverges greatly
from perceived intent. In China, major minority populations like the Uyghur, Miao, and
Mongolians lay far away from the densely populated, Han dominated coasts. Xinjiang, bordering
seven different countries, likely would be a top security issue for China even without the
Uyghurs due to the sensitivity of the Caspian Region. Border security, long an issue for the PRC
as exemplified by the brief Sino-Indian war over a small stretch of Western border demarcation
(Chakravorty, 2015), is perhaps a more significant reason for the securitization of the Uyghurs
and Xinjiang than TIP. Along with border security, the states beyond the border are important
aspects of Chinese foreign policy. Relations with Central Asian states, many of which border
Xinjiang, are important for Chinese economic development and general regional stability
(Clarke, 2015). It could be inferred that the Uyghurs are simply in the wrong place at the wrong
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time, occupying a geographically and economically strategic region for the PRC that contains a
significant amount of the country’s energy resources (Reccia, 2018). However, this would not
explain the state actions against Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang alone, and the drastic difference in
treatment between Uyghurs and Han in Xinjiang suggests a role identity issues being an
undergirding aspect of China’s security outlook towards the Uyghur.
The PRC has never been very accommodating toward organized religion, regardless of its origin
or background (Farr, 2008). Despite this blanket policy toward religion, there is not much
information to suggest that religion is the predominate antagonization towards the Chinese
security apparatus and the Uyghur. Despite also being Muslim, the Hui have had significantly
less chafing under the country’s policies (McKinney, 2006). Unlike the Uyghurs, the Hui are for
the most part ethnically Han and speaking Mandarin Chinese (McKinney, 2006). Outside of their
religion, the Hui occupy a cultural identity much more in line with the overarching national
character. The Uyghur for the most part are unable to speak Mandarin and do not share much in
physical or cultural characteristics with the Han. This has helped them partly fall victim to the
security apparatus due to being an “other”. Despite being a part of the Chinese state since the
Qing era, the Uyghur have occupied a fringe geographic, social, and economic role within
Chinese society (Guo, 2015). From the outset of the PRC, the Uyghurs were viewed with
suspicion due to collaboration with the Soviet Union in the establishment of a nominally
independent Uyghur territory in what would eventually become northern Xinjiang (Kanat, 2016).
Despite the quickly subsuming to the newly established PRC, the Uyghur dominated Xinjiang
was kept at arms by the state. Undoubtedly, Uyghur alienation to the PRC had been facilitated in
part by the decades of relative apathy the population was treated with by the central state (Kanat,
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2016). As the PRC encouraged the migration of Han citizens too Xinjiang, viewed by the
Uyghurs as at the expense of them, this alienation has increased. While it has been suggested by
Uyghur culture is simply not compatible with the PRC’s culture (McKinney, 2006), the
treatment of the Uyghur’s by the PRC would suggest that the issue more likely because the PRC
itself has not been accommodating toward the Uyghurs. Rather than pursuing accommodation,
the PRC has sought to instead shape the culture of the Uyghurs to fit better within state policy
(Klimeš, 2012). China has been willing to build mosques for the Uyghurs and its Muslim
population, but as Uyghurs have generally still not fallen in line, we have seen a continued
securitization of their space. The level of securitization is so noticeable that it has, in a
roundabout way, impact Uyghur culture unintentionally. This is most notable in how marriage
works now in Uyghur social circles, with the perception of security risk of marrying an
individual playing one of the largest roles in whether a couple is to be wed (Ding, 2018). The
long-standing troubled relationship between the Uyghurs and the PRC, which predates both any
organized Uyghur resistance groups or the existence of the Central Asian states, presupposes a
Chinese security outlook that is driven by ethnic biases. The Uyghurs are a minority in a state
run by and run for the Han. Occupying a region that has proven to be important to both Chinese
foreign and domestic policy has come to their detriment driving a security policy that has little
consideration for them. The official PRC policy of pursuing “ethnic harmony” is also
characteristic of Han chauvinism (Klimeš, 2012). For the Uyghur’s this has meant being given
only the option of falling in line with PRC policy regardless of its effects on them. Over time this
has increased Uyghur resistance to PRC policy, which creates a vicious cycle of securitization by
the state under the justification of Uyghur militancy and securing the domestic tranquility of
domestic China (Klimeš, 2012).
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Identity plays an important role in China’s security outlook towards the Uyghur’s. Lack of
understanding and alienation from the state for the Uyghurs is nicely explanatory for creation of
groups like TIP and China’s securitization of the Uyghurs. However, one should still question
why identity plays such a role and for what purpose. Is the Chinese state merely discriminatory
for discrimination sake? To conclude as much would de facto essentialize both the Uyghurs and
the Han as simply two ethnic groups that cannot coexist. In a way, it insinuates that the Han have
bigotry built in to their culture. However, China has a long history of inter-ethnic relations, and
the final Chinese dynasty was founded and ruled by those from the Manchu minority (Michael,
1965). The Silk Road involved interactions with an incredibly diverse array of cultures, and for
the most part this was successful. The idea of a Han-characterized China was specifically
rejected by Qing rulers, and the PRC itself took formal steps to recognize the native minority
populations (Klimeš, 2012). Right-winger leaders within the Nationalist party in their brief rule
over China did tend to struggle with minority acceptance, and this played a role in the eventual
victory of the PRC. There is more to explore when it comes to Chinese security police and the
Uyghurs, however it seems that there is a limit to the security outlook. The Uyghurs are viewed
as a security issue by China, but the underlying reasons are more complicated than from a
traditional state security policy.
Chinese Economic Policy and Outlook
The Chinese drive to modernization is undoubtedly the greatest economic project undertaken by
any state since the Soviet Union transformed the old Russian empire from a serf-dominated
backwater to an industrial hub. Like the industrialization drive undertaken by the Soviets,
Chinese society has experienced social upheaval due to the pace and scale of the project. What
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modernity entails, however, is also subject to the perception of the ruling elite in charge of the
project. It is unlikely that the PRC has purposely pursued a policy of modernization that conflicts
with Uyghur interests. Intentions are one thing, though, and the continued concentration of
wealth in Xinjiang among the Han population that dominate the urban areas of the province have
played an increasingly large role in driving tensions (Fogden, 2003). China’s economic pursuits
have meant often the transfer of prevailingly Han populations to existing peripheral urban areas
to take advantage of resource wealth. The Uyghur, in part due to decades of state failure to
alleviate as these issues, are less educated than their Han counterparts and have the disadvantage
of not speaking Mandarin (Fogden, 2003). For a state that has little time to waste in building out
its economic agenda, moving more culturally fitting Han people to maximize potential simply is
the most convenient option. General apprehension of the Uyghurs has also played a role in
economically marginalizing them, as the lack of willingness by the Chinese state to bridge the
cultural gap facilitates a mistrusting attitude toward giving Uyghurs more influence over state
policy (Fogden, 2003). The drive to modernity is planned and carried out by Han Chinese
government officials, and the lack of diversity in perspective has led this drive to meet the
Uyghurs in a ham-fisted fashion. Being economically isolated through a variety of cultural and
political policies, the Uyghur exist essentially outside of the socio-political sphere of the PRC.
institutionalized by the existence of the Chinese Hukou system (Zhang, 2014). Not only are Han
Chinese encouraged to or moved by the government to move cities like Ürümqi, there is little
opportunity for the rural Uyghurs to move into the city despite already living in the province.
The Hukou system separates Chinese citizens into two classifications: rural and urban (Zhang,
2014). Your classification is determinant of where you can reside and what access to rights you
get. Within China, minorities are overwhelmingly classed as rural, and due to Hukou often
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cannot reside within urban centers unless their classification is changed. While the process for
classification change has become easier in recent years, language and educational barriers make
it virtually impossible for minorities like the Uyghur to change their classification. As Xinjiang
has grown in importance for its position as a transportation hub and large reserves of fuel and
mineral resources, the need for an urban working population has grown. Despite living already
within the province, the Uyghurs are functionally shut out of these economic gains simply
because they cannot live where they are taking place. As more Han move into Xinjiang, there are
is fear by Uyghurs that they are being purposely displaced by the shift in demographics, leading
to further alienation and potential for radicalization (Fogden, 2003). Like the use of Palestinians
by Israel as a workforce, Uyghurs are also used as cheap labor for work by the Chinese state and
transported throughout the country to work (Clarke, 2015). It is important to note the perception
of this by Uyghurs, as the 2009 Ürümqi riots were kicked off by the assaults against several
young Uyghur men for alleged sexual assault in a factory all the way in Guangdong.
Having a cheap labor force without any significant access to capital is good for maximizing the
returns on economic growth in any macro-sense. The US’s treatment of its black population is
one of the best historical examples of this. While there were social and identity factors at play
that often were used as the outward justification for the continuation of the oppression of black
Americans, the system was ultimately kept in place for several hundred years, from slavery
through sharecropping, as it allowed for an incredibly cheap workforce with little to no leverage
in relationship to the state (Stella). While arguably not as purposefully developed as slavery, the
development of minority populations like the Palestinians and Uyghurs into cheap workforces in
seems to follow a similar pattern (Clarke, 2015). The economic status quo for the Uyghurs is
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now justified through the need to maintain security domestically and abroad for China. While it
is too much to suggest that the securitization of the Uyghurs is purely a result of the economic
outlook of the PRC, it playing a larger than acknowledged role could potentially explain China’s
unwillingness to cooperate in broader regional security arrangements (Wallace, 2014). Even the
United States, often an oppositional force in China’s drive to develop its economy and power in
world affairs, has long been interested in cooperating in Central Asian anti-terror initiatives in
part to its perception of the Uyghurs also being a security threat (Smith, 2009). While the US is
not being altruistic in its overtures seeing a benefit from bettered regional anti-terror programs
for itself, there has been little to suggest a good reason for China’s lack of response.
China’s drive to modernity and economic development further necessitates the strict control of
the Uyghurs due to where they themselves live. While there is some benefit to having them as a
cheap labor force, there is the genuine issue of the militant groups like TIP disrupting the
economic activities happening in and through Xinjiang to the detriment of the rest of the country
(Hyer, 2006). China has worked to develop close relations with neighboring Central Asian states,
in part for regional stability and its own economic expansion (Seo and Cho, 2013). These Central
Asian states have become some of China’s largest suppliers of its favorite fuel: natural gas
(Reccia, 2018). China’s expansive “Belt Road Initiative” is its re-integration into global trade,
following a remarkably similar path to the old Silk Road. The gas pipelines and trade routes all
happen to have to go through Xinjiang, and in turn where the Uyghurs reside. Rail lines
connecting Central Asia to China have been attacked on occasion by TIP, and the threat of even
a temporary severing of these transportation links would have devastating economic effect in
China (Reccia, 2018). Having massively important economic drivers cross directly through one
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of your most volatile domestic regions is not ideal for China let alone any country, and
understandably is a driving force in the securitization of the Uyghur populace (Seo and Cho,
2013). As we examine the economic forces at play for China and specifically in Xinjiang, the
extent and specificity of the security measures that take place seem to make more sense. While
the social issues in Xinjiang are a headache, the social issues that the state would be face if it
could not feed the economic engine it has built in the rest of the country would destroy its
legitimacy. Perhaps a calculated trade-off has been made by the PRC.
Outside Influences
The Uyghurs do not live in a cultural vacuum. In fact, they share many cultural commonalities
with other Central Asian groups, specifically those of a Turkic background. Uyghur ethnic
identity is a relatively new one, with its development coalescing around the labeling of a myriad
of Turkic Muslim groups that the Qing moved into the region many years ago. With the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the creation of several new states, the years of isolation from the rest of
the Turkic cultural world ended practically overnight for the Uyghurs (Hyer, 2006). Interest in
independence by the Uyghurs, with the public support for Uyghurs by the populace of countries
like Kazakhstan, picked up quickly in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. TIP’s
continued existence is facilitated in part due to the sympathetic attitudes of much of the Central
Asian and Turkish publics toward the cause of the Uyghurs, viewing them as oppressed cousins
and allowing for the organization to continue its existence in these countries despite being
labeled as a terrorist organization by the governments in all of them (Clarke, 2007). Turkey,
emerging out of the chaotic 1990’s as a regional power, has also been willing to put its finger on
the scale for the Uyghur cause, primarily to appease to public appetite. While there is no
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evidence of Turkey having significant involvement in Xinjiang beyond, there have been
indications of its support for Uyghur independence causes to the chagrin of China.
Some of the outside support for Uyghur independence is more insidious than just the shared
cultural norms. A little over three years ago, a bombing was carried out in Bangkok, Thailand.
Authorities for the most part could not parse the reason for the bombing immediately, further
hampered by no militant groups claiming responsibility. Following an investigation, Thai
authorities would reveal that members of the Turkish islamo-nationalist group the Grey Wolves
had carried out the bombing (Murdoch, 2015). The bombing was suspected to have been carried
out because of the agreed deportation of 109 ethnically Uyghur Chinese nationals to China,
where they faced potential arrest and certain separation from their families (Murdoch, 2015).
While Turkey does not officially condone the Grey Wolves or any Uyghur independence
activity, it has been more than willing to look the other way for Turkic-nationalist groups. The
2009 Ürümqi riots and the Chinese response saw outcry in parts of the Turkic world, with large
rallies for the Uyghur held throughout Turkey. The Grey Wolves, notorious for their willingness
to involve themselves with Turkic group issues abroad and for being responsible for attacks like
the attempted murder of Pope John Paull II, were going to bat for their Uyghur cousins.
Analysis
From Uyghur marriages to their residences, the scope and scale of the Chinese securitization
within Uyghur society proves to be one of the most intrusive in recent history. The Uyghurs
historically uneasy position within the PRC has given way to modern security concerns operated
through the contemporary strategy and lingo of the day. Getting in the way of China’s
ascendancy domestically has never been a particularly successful position, and the Uyghurs are
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no exception to the evidence of the PRC’s willingness to go to great lengths to maintain its
legitimacy. Rounding up tens of thousands of Uyghurs and putting them through “education
centers” is a policy that bears reminiscence to state-minority disasters that occurred throughout
the 20th century. Like most subjects in the field of political science, there is not one answer for
the current relationship between the Uyghurs and the PRC. The research in this paper indicates
that a confluence of security, economic, and outside actor factors play significant roles in the
rapidly deteriorating position of the Uyghurs. As of this writing, there is still little widespread
information available on the extent of the reported re-education centers and the escalation of
Chinese security policy towards the Uyghurs.
The security outlook was shown to clearly affect the rights of the Uyghur within the PRC and
their relationship with the PRC. China’s need for border security and regional stability has come
at the consequence of the rights like freedom of movement and participation in traditional
Uyghur cultural norms. The Uyghur independence movement threatens to damage core PRC
values, ethnic harmony and state integrity. However, despite the observable effect of the
securitization of the Uyghurs within Chinese society, the security outlook variable alone is not a
strong enough variable to account for the development of the state security apparatus for the
Uyghurs. As an alternative explanation, the security outlook of the Chinese state should be
rejected. While analyzing the security outlook of the PRC, it became apparent that it was
important to understand why the PRC has the security outlook that it does. China’s economic
outlook, our independent variable, proved to give consistently better answers to the development
of the Chinese-Uyghur relationship and what was driving the securitization of the Uyghurs. The
increase in security measures was not proven alone to be necessitated from the attacks of a single
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fringe militant group. While the 2009 Ürümqi riots were notable and a significant event, there
has likely been more race-related riots in the US since 2009 than what was seen in China.
However, when the securitization of the Uyghur is analyzed through the economic perspective,
the reason the lengths the state has taken against the Uyghurs have become more apparent.
Michael Clarke’s relation of the situation to the dynamics present between Israel and Palestinians
drove home the role of economic exploitation in the security outlook of China and its impact on
the Uyghurs. The Uyghurs, an isolated minority that has little social capital within Chinese
society, have no recourse other than agitation outside of the state. For the Chinese state, the
Uyghurs are only good for cheap labor and getting out of the way of their energy production.
This outside agitation development is further shown by the involvement of outside actors like the
Grey Wolves, who act as outlets for the intense repression Uyghurs experience in China. Unlike
within the Han core, where the PRC tends to be much more willing to respond to the whims of
the public, the Uyghurs have no leverage in their relationship with the PRC. With China in a
position of playing catch-up regarding the rest of the industrialized world, the Uyghurs are an
easily sacrificed group on its path forward. China’s economic perspective, specifically its need to
satisfy considerable energy needs, mean that the Chinese state will utilize its security apparatus
to maintain the inequal socio-economic relationship it has with the Uyghurs to maximize capital
accumulation. While apathy was long the implicit policy of the PRC toward the region, the
economic importance of Xinjiang that has emerged in the past two decades has necessitated the
PRC needing to exercise more direct, forceful control over the non-Han inhabitants. As a result
of these findings, this case study supports our hypothesis.
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If China were serious about pursuing ethnic harmony, rather than ethnic compromising, it should
purse a policy of economic integration for the Uyghur. This would require access and
distribution to the wealth generated by resource extraction and transportation in Xinjiang for
them. To accomplish this, China could work to change its administrative functions in the region
to allow for bilingual work environments and an explicit program of rural-to-urban
reclassification for Uyghurs who would be interested in moving into the city. Bettering the
educational opportunities for Uyghurs would also go a long way to allowing Uyghurs better
ability to work in positions outside of menial labor. Re-defining what modernization means for
the PRC, with input and inclusion of the Uyghurs, is necessary to alleviate much of the tensions
that exist. Instead of viewing the Uyghurs as a workforce to cheaply exploit, the PRC should
view integrating the native Uyghur population within the state as part of China’s modernity
project. Minority populations will not be satisfied with their position within in their respective
country unless they have some form of representation and opportunity within it. While Chinese
officials bemoan the lack of Uyghurs willingness to conform to state measures, the PRC has
given Uyghurs no real material incentive to do so. In the United States, the inflammation of
racial tensions was cooled for decades by the passage of the Civil Rights Acts, which brought
immediate material changes for black Americans throughout the country. While no minority is
necessarily disenfranchised in a similar sense in China due to the lack of an electoral system,
disenfranchisement in China takes on a more explicitly economic character. Getting minority
buy-in also means killing any existing support for militant groups and is likely the single most
effective policy for permanently shuttering them.
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It is probably more likely that the PRC’s relationship with the Uyghurs as of now is not
deliberately developed and executed, but instead an occurrence of circumstances and an expected
aspect of capital accumulation that will occur under capitalism. This does not excuse the state’s
treatment of the Uyghurs, however, as the Uyghur population does not deserve the treatment it
receives.
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CHAPTER 5: TURKEY AND THE KURDS

Introduction
Kurds have long inhabited the lands that make up what is today’s Turkey’s southeastern
borderland. The ethnic strife between the Kurds and the Turkish central government predates
most minority conflicts that are ongoing today by decades. From the very outset of the Turkish
state’s inception, it has grappled with a self-imposed question: what to do with its Kurds? Out of
any state that is discussed in this research, Turkey and its relationship with the Kurds has the
largest body of work available due to the length of the tensions. The history of rebellions and
protracted domestic conflicts by Kurdish forces in Turkey have necessitated the central state to
develop an extensive security apparatus for use internally. Kurdish inhabited regions of Turkey
have long been economic backwaters, and until relatively recently the Turkish state saw little
economic use of the regions. However, today the region serves as an important transportation
hub for oil and gas throughout the region. The development of oil and gas pipelines has greatly
increased the influence of the Turkish state over the region but has also added a new dynamic to
the tenuous security situation it maintains with the Kurdish locals.
Today, the HDP, a predominately Kurdish left-wing party, has managed to gain a foothold in the
Turkish legislative body despite numerous attempts to weaken its position and prevent it from
passing the necessary vote threshold. At the same time, sporadic violence has continued in the
Kurdish populated southeast, led predominately by the renewed PKK. Despite years of a
renewed peace process initiated by the religiously conservative AKP party’s rise to power, the
potential for peace was derailed largely in part to the ramifications of the Syrian Civil War.
Under Erdogan and the AKP rule, Turkey has looked to assert itself economically and culturally
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among the rest of the Middle East, and the proliferation and strength of PKK affiliate PYD in
northern Syria came into conflict with these goals. The collapse of the peace process, and the
strain Turkish aims in Syria have placed on its relationship with allies like the US, has pushed
the Turkish state under the AKP into a dynamic previously the republic has avoided.
The question of identity has continued to be an undergirding topic in any analysis of the Turkish
security outlook on the Kurds, and laws and actions in this vein have long been informed by the
explicit identification of Turkey being a country of and for Turkish people. Despite the overtures
initially made by the moderate Islamist AKP towards religious Kurds, ethnic identity has
managed to trump this. It would be disingenuous to not consider that identity, rather than
security outlook, drives the Turkish state’s antagonism towards its Kurds.
History
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of its defeat in World War 1 wrought intense
conflict throughout the scraps of the remainder of its lands. Eventually, through military
prowess, Turkish national hero Ataturk and his nationalist forces rallied enough support to take
control over Istanbul and the entirety of Anatolia. In doing so, Ataturk had begun the process of
creating the Republic of Turkey (Lanza, 2017). Inspired to “modernize”, Ataturk worked to form
the newly established republic in the traditional nation state model, including a secular
constitution. This was a radical departure from the officially Muslim Ottoman Empire. The
Kurds at this time were overwhelming rural and still lived according to tribal codes. (Bilgin and
Sarıhan, 2013). In 1925, the Sheikh Said rebellion, led by Kurds, brought the onus of the Turkish
government onto the backwater southeast. Having just pushed out occupying forces and crushing
Greek uprisings in the coastal Anatolia regions, further ethnic strife was planned to be put down
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with haste. The Turkish state’s early security policy of identifying and repressing ethnic Kurds
helped foment the previously vacuous ethnic identity of the Kurds in Turkey. Several decades
later, the Turkish state’s main Kurdish antagonist would be formed. The Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) was founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization that looked to achieve national liberation
for the Kurdish people in Turkey (Özcan, 2006). In 1983, the Language Ban Act was passed by
the Turkish government (Natali, 2005). As a result of this new law, made to target specifically
the Kurdish population, the Turkish language was the only language legally allowed to be taught,
spoken, or written (McDowall, 1996). Due to the bordering Syria’s machinations against Turkey,
the PKK leadership would successfully operate out of Syria. With how remote eastern Turkey is,
and effective guerrilla tactics of the PKK, the Turkish military struggled (Özcan, 2006). New
strategies were sought to combat the threat, and military officials would devise a tactic with
“divide and conquer” in mind. The Village Guard system would be introduced in the 1980’s
implemented in Kurdish regions of Turkey. It was set up to allow for the Turkish military to
more easily flush out PKK militants, tasking the village guards with preventing locals in the
village from joining the PKK or harboring them. Village guards were to be Kurdish villagers
who were picked or volunteered for the job. Over time, the implementation of the village guard
system and Turkey’s campaign against the PKK resulted in the forcible displacement of between
380,000 and 1.5 million Kurds from their homes in the southeast (HRW, 2002). According to
Human Rights Watch, these forcible expulsions were done through the torching of homes, crops,
and livestock to terrify and undermine the economic base of Kurdish citizens, driving them
westward into the slums of cities. Humans Rights Watch stated that “by 1994, more than 3,000
villages had been virtually wiped from the map and more than a quarter of a million peasants had
been made homeless” (HRW, 2002). A ceasefire would be called following the successful
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capture of Ocalan, the PKK’s leader, in Nairobi in 1999. Ocalan would be imprisoned in solitary
confinement, eventually commuted to life in prison, and the PKK ceased all fighting (Lanza,
2017). Still, Turkey had failed to facilitate a long-term peace process with the PKK (Gunes,
2011).
In 2001, various conservative parties in Turkey merged to create the moderate Islamist party the
Justice and Development Party (AKP). It did not take long for the AKP to secure a majority in
the Turkish parliament. Under AKP leadership, Turkey generally experienced economic growth
and would pursue large infrastructure projects throughout the country (Lanza, 2017). The AKP
would gain electoral popularity with large populations of Kurds despite not being a Kurdish
party (Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015). This is likely a result of the large population of more
religiously inclined Kurds and their identification with Islam over their ethnicity. It helped that
the AKP were willing to pursue meaningful economic development of Kurdish inhabited
regions. A political niche, the conservative Kurdish vote, was filled by the AKP. (Cavanaugh
and Hughes, 2015). The AKP-led Turkish government entered negotiations with Ocalan in 2012
with the intention of finding a final resolution to the long-running conflict.
During this time, another important political party would be formed in Turkey. The Peoples’
Democratic Party (HDP) is a left-wing party in favor of Kurdish rights and generalized left-wing
economic and social policy for all of Turkey, another in a long line of political parties
(Cavanaugh and Hughes, 2015). As the peace negotiations moved along, the Syrian Civil War
led to the rise of the PKK affiliates in Syria and in Iraq. Turkey grew increasingly concerned
over the increasing influence PYD exerted in Syria. The ensuing tension PKK and AKP
interrupted what had previously been fruitful negotiations (Lanza, 2017). Despite years of work,
the peace process would again be ended by a renewal of the insurgency within Turkey towards
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the end of 2015 (Saeed, 2017). Returning from the Qandil mountains, the PKK would descend
on southeastern Turkey to engage the Turkish military once again.
Turkish Security Policy and Outlook
As of this writing, the Turkish state faces existential conflicts at its doorstep for the first time
since the war waged to form the republic. The devolution of the Syrian Civil War into a grinding
stalemate and the collapse of the Islamic State (ISIS) has helped Turkey position itself for an
increased presence in Syria and Iraq, especially as the United States has pulled back on its
forward involvement in the conflict (C. Phillips, 2017). Turkey has been a member of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, mostly operating under the direction of the
treaty organization since then (Atanisiu). Under the direction of Erdogan and the ruling AKP
party, Turkish security policy has detached itself from the NATO direction and instead has
pursued a more assertive security policy (Atanisiu). This increasing independence of Turkish
security policy became clear with the Turkish parliaments vote to deny the host and transfer of
US troops for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Ozcan, 2011). A more autonomous security policy
from NATO even included the development of a larger, more privatized military-defense
industry within Turkey (Kurç, 2017). After the stalling of integration within the European
community, Turkey has made explicit moves into establishing itself as a regional power. Neoottomanism is often the term used to refer to these efforts by the Turkish state in the past decade,
however much of its efforts have retained the Turkish nationalist tints of the other, secular
Turkish political parties. This has been done predominately through economic and diplomatic
means, however the conflict that ruptured throughout Syria and Iraq has provided space for
Turkey to assert its military power in the region openly (Todorova, 2015). It also meant that
Turkey would look to reincorporate NATO more prominently into its security policy (Kogan,
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2015). While traditionally this meant taking the lead of the US, Turkey has used its membership
in the alliance to leverage support for its own aims in the Middle East, particularly in Syria
(Kogan, 2015). While Turkey has been successful in growing its profile in military matters in the
region, it has come at a cost.
Bordering Syria and Iraq has long presented the Turkish state a myriad of security issues.
Whether it was the harboring of groups like the PKK across their borders or the general
antagonism between the states toward each other over different points in history, securing its
eastern neighborhood has become an increasingly prominent aspect of Turkish security policy
(Todorova, 2015). With the ending of Syrian state support for the PKK and the capture of
Ocalan, Turkish security policy has become more dynamic regarding its neighbors (Ozcan,
2011). Turkish security policy had long struggled to with the dynamics of eastern neighbors due
to large part that is borders with these neighbors were also predominately populated ethnic
Kurds. Kurdish separatism had been most prominent and prevalent historically in Iraq, and
historically the Turkish state has viewed this as a security threat and potential for emboldening
separatists within its own borders.
However, just like the rest of the world, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and
ensuing wars greatly changed the security environment for Turkey (Ayman and Gunluk-Senesen,
2016). Notably, Turkey’s relationship with the ruling Kurdish party in the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG) of Iraq has blossomed in the past decade (Ozcan, 2011). Through mutual
support for each other’s regimes and Turkey’s willingness to cut the KRG in on the gas and oil
pipeline wealth it has been generating, it has secured a reliable neighbor at long last on its Iraqi
border. Turkey has inserted itself into regional disputes and conflicts often as a mediator, a stark
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contrast to its typical policy of ignorance and focus on securing its domestic security (Ozcan,
2011). These changes have led to Turkey playing a larger role in the region, but with a larger role
it has also meant that its obligations have increased. At its high point, Turkey has hosted
approximately three million refugees fleeing the violence in Syria (Atanansiu). These refugees
have presented a heightened security threat to Turkey, as concerns about their economic issues
has pushed Turkey to more aggressively pursue control over northern Syria.
Initially, the AKP’s willingness to engage with the PKK and better the status of Kurds within
Turkey came out of strategy and empathy due to the restrictions the AKP’s Islamist predecessors
had long faced by the Turkish security apparatus (Brakel, 2016). The AKP had long prioritized
domestically ending the armed Kurdish struggle in the southeastern portion of the country,
initiating a ceasefire with the PKK and beginning a new accord. It has attempted to do so through
not only the peace process, but also allowing for limited Kurdish civic engagement in the country
via the legalization of the Kurdish language in schools and targeted social assistance programs
(Yörük, 2012). However, the process has also been impugned upon by the willingness of the
AKP, as it has progressively become more ingrained into the Turkish state, to continue to utilize
the Turkish state security apparatus to arrest and harass Kurdish political leaders (Yörük, 2012).
Turkey’s domestic Kurdish inhabitants have continued to play an outsized role and focus on its
security policy. Despite the civic and economic overtures utilized by the AKP led Turkish
government and the pickup of religiously Kurds as a part of its constituency, ironically Turkey’s
attempts to pacify its Kurdish population has been mostly ended because of Kurds across its
Syrian border (Brakel, 2016). Exacerbated by its often-unstable or antagonistic neighbors to its
east, Turkey has always struggled with the presence of Kurds on both sides of its borders. Unlike
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most states with a large minority population, Turkey has never seriously sought out any sort of
recognition or devolution of power to its Kurdish residents. While the border between Iraq and
Turkey has always been relatively porous due to the Qandil mountains and therefore a
convenient staging location for the PKK, Syria’s Kurds have become the Turkish state’s
predominant security threat (Phillips, 2017). The success of Syrian Kurds, affiliates of the PKK,
in pushing out ISIS and setting up its own autonomous government has meant for not only a
threat of Kurdish self-government outside of its control has had far-reaching security
consequences for Kurds domestically (Brakel, 2016).
For a brief moment in time, the Turkish security apparatus was not focused on its domestic
Kurdish population. The consolidation of northern Syria under Kurdish socialist led control was
deemed to significant of a threat to Turkey to allow for its continuance. However clear it was that
antagonizing the Syrian Kurds would hurt the peace process with the PKK, the AKP led Turkish
state took the familiar security route in dealing with the issue. When it became clear to the PKK
that Turkey was no longer seriously pursuing the peace process, the ceasefire was declared dead
and Kurdish populated towns across the southeast were taken over by PKK-affiliated Kurdish
youth (Brakel, 2016). While Kurdish militias within and bordering Turkey pre-empted much of
the reintroduction of securitization of the Kurds within Turkey, it would be misleading to not
acknowledge the general trend since the 2011 for the Turkish state has been to curtail general
citizenry rights and strengthen the power of the state (Rubin, 2017). Protests in Turkey and the
Arab Spring were viewed as security threats to the burgeoning regional power of Turkey, and
this trend of securitization has swept up much of the country (Rubin, 2017). The Kurdish
citizenry has been, however, the most heavily focused on by the encroachment of the state. As
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peace negotiations stalled, arbitrary raids on HDP offices and arrests of party officials and MPs
caused chaos across their base of support after a general sate of emergency was declared by the
Turkish government (Rubin, 2017). Due to sheer electoral popularity, the HDP has managed to
continue despite the state’s attempts to undermine it. With the ramping up of Turkish military
involvement in Syria and the displacement of Kurds from Afrin in Syria, it is likely that the
Turkish security outlook will continue to understand the Kurdish minority as a security issue.
Turkish Economic Policy and Outlook
Similar to the other states that are discussed in this paper, China and Russia, Turkey is in the
midst of a burgeoning economy that it has fueled heavily through trade and fossil fuel extraction
and transportation (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu, 2011). Turkey had long utilized a state-centered
economy policy, with most industry under the control of the government. Since the rise of the
AKP, Turkey has pursued a more liberal economic policy (Dorlach and Savaşkan, 2018). This
has meant for increasing privatization of industry throughout the country, including some of
Turkey’s most economically productive. Under the direction of the AKP, Turkey has
experienced some of its most consistent and prolonged periods of economic growth (Kirisci and
Kaptangolu, 2011). Despite the major worldwide recession in 2008, Turkey’s economy managed
the downturn relatively better than comparable developing states. This economic growth has
included the Kurdish population to a certain extent, with a general bettering of their economic
position across the country. Most Kurds work now in the low-level labor force, predominately
the informal field (Yörük, 2012). While far from the most economically prosperous of jobs, this
increase in economic status is still a better position than prior, where much of the Kurdish
population had little to no economic opportunities. The AKP has utilized the expansion of means
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tested welfare programs to help uplift low-income citizens, with a large portion of the benefit
going to Kurds in the southeastern portion of the country (Yörük, 2012). These targeted
economic programs for Kurdish people were seen as overtures to solidify the relatively large
sized Kurdish portion of the AKP based. Despite the rhetorical overtures to an empathetic, more
charitable state, the AKP has continued to increase the rate of privatization of industry following
in line with a liberal economic line. This is despite the tendency of successful developing states
to utilize centralized planning more heavily in aiding their development (Kutlay and Karaoğuz,
2018). Turkish economic policy has also expanded in scope, tying in diplomatic relations with
neighboring states in its development (Ozcan, 2017). This is an especially important
development for its status as a trading hub (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu, 2011). Bettered relations
with neighboring states have been a specific policy of Turkey, predominately on a basis of
security but also for the expansion of its economy.
Turkey’s aims to grow into a regional economic hub have been driven predominately by its
utilization of its location to act as a transport corridor for oil and gas from the rest of the Middle
East to Europe (Bilgin, 2011). It has also been driven by its population’s needs. Since 1973 to
2000, the energy needs of the population has more than tripled (Bilgin, 2011). While the AKP
led government has managed to keep up energy production to match the expansion of the
economy and of the needs of the population, it is a constant battle to keep up. Of major European
gas importers, Turkey far outpaces the others in its gas intensity, or rate of population use of gas
(Dastan and Selcuk). Turkey is one of the fastest growing energy markets “in terms of natural
gas and electricity demand growth (Newman, 2017). It is second only to China, on top of the fact
that ninety-nine percent of its gas consumed is imported (Newman, 2017). Natural gas shortages
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have impacted Turkey, particularly in the colder winters (Dastan and Selcuk). For any
government concerned with maintaining its legitimacy, especially considering contentious
elections, this is a significant issue. Balancing the consumption needs of the population and the
economic growth has driven much of Turkey’s economic policy and outlook. Through 2023, it is
expected that Turkey will have to invest upwards to 130 billion dollars into its energy
infrastructure to keep up with demand (Akbalik and Kavcioglu, 2014). The energy sector plays
an increasingly large role in Turkey’s economy, especially as it has become more dependent on it
for economic health and to meet the country’s energy needs (Yorucu and Mehmet, 2018).
Turkey’s goals in becoming an energy hub are colored increasingly by the need to secure its
infrastructure from security risks (Iseri, 2012).

Two of the most productive pipelines Turkey has go through to Iraqi Kurdistan, which has been
a productive relationship for both parties. These pipelines mostly go through ethnically Kurdish
populated regions, which has presented Turkey an increasingly difficult economic security
situation. As discussed previously, Turkey has managed to leverage a good relationship with the
Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq through its development of the pipelines and willingness
to give legitimacy toward the Barzani-led government (Bilgin, 2011). Despite the bettering of
intergovernmental relations, the Kurdish public in Iraq still view Turkey with suspicion. The gap
in perception between the KRG government and its people has allowed PKK members to still
utilize the Qandil mountains as a base of operations and has allowed for successful attacks on the
pipelines at the cost of millions of dollars (Iseri, 2012). The attacks are not isolated to just near
the Turkey-Iraq border, with pipeline sabotage occurring at the Iranian border as recently as
2015 (Middle East Eye). The mountainous, rural area between Iran and Turkey is also heavily
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inhabited by ethnic Kurds. Between 1987 and 2010, Turkey reported 59 sabotages of pipelines
by the PKK, or about two to three attacks a year (Iseri, 2012). Essentially, any region that has a
large Kurdish population presents a significant threat to Turkey’s economic aims. For the PKK,
its ability to damage important gas and oil pipelines with relative ease was a large part of the
leverage it had in getting Turkey to the negotiating table for a permanent peace process. It is
unlikely that it was a coincidence that pipeline attacks started up at major pipeline routes again
when the peace process fell apart. As the AKP led Turkish government’s relationship with the
Kurdish population has worsened due to its efforts in Syria, it has undoubtedly internally had to
grapple with the fact that its economic arteries are surrounded by a population that has chafed
under state control for several decades. The Turkish-state’s relationship with its Kurdish
population is defined by its inequality, and the lack of any fundamental change to the socioeconomic status of the Kurdish population has again found the Kurds as a barrier to economic
prosperity, rather as a group to be uplifted.
Analysis
The Turkish’s state’s relationship with the Kurds is undoubtedly one defined by how fraught it
has been. While the history of any state is important and informative to present day relations, the
history of the Turkish state’s oppositional position with its Kurdish inhabitants is particularly
interesting. Emerging from a multi-ethnic, Muslim empire that had ruled the region for several
hundred years, it is well known that Ataturk took Turkey in a specifically secular, Turkish
direction. Long the arbiter of the Muslim world, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had much
greater implications than the formation of dozens of new countries. Fighting to establish the
Turkish identity alongside its borders, the founders of the modern Turkish state were quickly at
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odds with the Kurdish inhabitants simply due to their differing ethnicity. Minorities in Turkey
were generally viewed as a security threat by the new republic, but the Kurds were unique in that
that they were also Muslims and composed by far the largest share of the minority populace.
Therefore, they were the largest threat to the security of Turkey. In the decades that have
followed there has been little to challenge the Kurds position on this. The economic outlook of it
has clearly played a meaningful role the relationship of the state and the Kurds. Historically the
country’s poorest inhabitants, for most of the 20th century the Kurds existed outside Turkey’s
economic mainstream living rural, village style lives.
Unity of the state is a definitive aspect of Turkey. Specifically, unity under a Turkish identity.
The security threat posed to the Kurds to this explicit pursuit of the nation-state by Turkey is
clear through their very existence. Perhaps the intent of the Turkish state is explained in part of
the attempts of the Entente at the end of World War 1 to split up the Ottoman Empire based off
its ethnic composition through the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish state was founded through
military conflict by military officers in specific pursuit of establishing a Turkish state. Minorities
were the initial security threat and remained as much, the Kurds being the largest and most
resilient. The banning of Kurdish language and cultural norms, the razing of thousands of
villages, and the decades of criminalization of Kurdish-specific political parties has reinforced
the fact that Turkey has no interest in even feigning that it is a multi-ethnic state. Dissent
through existence is more than enough to justify being a security threat in any regime, and
resistance in any capacity will be viewed at best suspicion. The Kurdish willingness to resist
through military means is up for debate for its effectiveness, but it does justify more easily state
repression against the Kurds. Turkey has developed an intense, extensive securitization of the
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Kurdish population through its village guard program and large-scale military presence in the
southeast. With the movement of many Kurds to urban centers throughout Turkey the scope of
the security threat Kurds present to Turkey has expanded. Efforts to assimilate the population
mostly stagnated, and in turn there is always the potential in the Turkish security apparatuses
analysis for an attack far outside of the rural southeast. The security outlook of the Turkish state
is easily discernible. Unlike in our other case studies, the security outlook variable does have a
better case for being an alternative explanation to the state repression of Kurds.
Turkey’s economic policy and outlook does play a role, however, and likely more than it used to
in relation to the Kurds. The impact of the economic situation that the Kurds faced is best
articulated by the fact that the most successful Kurdish organization, at least regarding sustaining
itself, is the PKK. Originally a Marxist-Leninist national liberation organization, it still maintains
socialist principals in its organizing even as it has evolved ideologically. Up until recently, the
Kurds were so economically disenfranchised that they were hardly even part of the broader
Turkish proletariat (Yörük, 2012). For the Turkish state, the Kurds were of little use
economically historically due to their inhabitance of the rural southeast which holds no resources
even for extraction. The economic issues were more one-sided in this relationship, and that lends
credence to the idea that the Kurdish people are predominately a security issue for the Turkish
state. In the latter portion of the 20th century and throughout the 21st century, an economic
element has been become prominent through the locations of the oil and gas pipelines. Simply
through sheer geography and resource locations, Turkey has been in the position that its largest
suppliers of gas and oil must travel predominately through Kurdish inhabited regions. A growing
population and a foreign policy predicated off of building up regional authority has driven this
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development. While the security threat is readily apparent, the economic implications are less so
outside of the risks of disrupted oil supplies. The pipelines must be built near Kurdish villages
and towns, and the economic benefit of the pipelines are not beyond the local’s comprehension.
The modest economic gains of a large portion of the Kurdish population ironically make it
likelier for them to seek inclusion in these economic benefits of fuel transportation. Another
mouth to feed at the table that is already struggling to be fed strains the Turkish government and
incentivizes economic exclusion of the Kurdish population.
For Turkey, its pursuit of regional influence and specific formation as a state plays an outsized
role in its efforts to restrict Kurdish rights. The existence of the Kurds is antithetical to the
founding principles of Turkey, which play a major cultural role in Turkish culture and informs
the state’s actions. The economic outlook of the state variable, especially in more recent times,
has played a larger role in the relationship between the state and the Kurds. While the Kurdish
people have long been motivated in their resistance, exemplified by the ideology of the PKK and
the leftist HDP, to the state by their economic conditions, this still played little role in the
decision making of the Turkish state towards them. Our alternative explanation, the security
outlook of the Turkish state, has something of a case due to the historic underpinnings of Turkish
state repression. However, an important perspective in support of the independent variable, the
economic outlook of the state, is that in the formation of the Turkish state the expelling of and
repression of ethnic minorities did have substantial economic incentive. Through expulsions and
repression, new property and farmland could be freed up for ethnic Turks, making easier for this
new state to justify its national character. In the case of the Kurds, keeping Kurds repressed has
meant that Turkey has been able to expend less capital on their development. In the case of
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Turkey, this paper’s hypothesis is not necessarily rejected nor supported, as the historic reasons
for the securitization of the Kurds were not economic in nature until the Turkish state expanded
its economic efforts eastward.
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CHAPTER 6: RUSSIA AND THE CHECHENS

Introduction
The Russian Federation, the largest country by landmass in the entire world, is predominately
populated by ethnic Russians. Eighty-one percent of the country’s 140 million or so residents are
ethnic Russians, mostly living in the European portion of the country. While Russians are the
dominant ethnic group, the country is still very ethnically and religiously diverse. Ukrainians,
Germans, Armenians, Chechens, Kazakhs, and many more groups compose upwards of 185
ethnic groups that reside within its borders. While the Russian Federation is a relatively young
country, only coming into existence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union, it retained the
defunct country’s federated form of governance despite the substantial reduction in borders.
Russia is federated in republics and oblasts, with 28 official ethnically based republics. While the
ethnic republics are historically a play to alleviate potential nationalist sentiment among the
diverse population, they have not been without their issues. This includes one of the most ethnic
republics contentious in the country: Chechnya. Chechnya is an ethnic republic of Russia in the
North Caucasus region mostly populated by ethnic Chechens. Most Chechens are Sunni Muslims
and speak both Russian and the native Chechen language. Chechnya has about 1.2 million
residents, 95% of which are ethnically Chechen and Sunni Muslims. With the breakup of the
Soviet Union, must of the ethnic Russian population that once inhabited Chechnya has left in
light of the violence that befell the republic with the secessionist movement.
Chechnya was site to intense violence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union due to its
declaration of independence from the newly formed Russian Federation. While the Soviet Union
had officially dissolved on the lines of the now former Soviet Republics is was composed of, the
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Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR’s) were to be retained. Chechyna was one of these
many ASSR’s, but the only one to seriously pursue breaking away. What followed was two
intense wars between Chechen secessionist forces and the Russian state. The first war left
Chechnya outside of the control of Russia but broken by the violence, the second war ending its
resistance in an official capacity but beginning a prolonged period of militia violence in
Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus. The wars and ensuing violence destroyed the
economy of Chechnya and has had a clear shaping effect on the direction of the republic since
then. Today, Chechnya is led by Ramzan Kadyrov, who has run it through varying positions
since 2011. The small republic has continued to garner serious attention from Moscow, with
Kadyrov running Chechnya with its blessing. While the militia led violence has been less
commonplace in Chechnya, must of the state repression against the populace is done through
official state faculties. Chechnya garnered worldwide interest again when it was revealed that
under Ramzan Kadyrov the republic was targeting LGBT Chechens and placing them in
“concentration camps”. Reports on potential state sanctioned murders of accused gay Chechens
have again brought attention to a part of the world that has known considerable amounts of
violence.
History
The relationship of the modern Russian state and its Chechen inhabitants is historically fraught,
comparable to the typically poor relations between Turkey and its Kurdish population. Tsarist
Russia underwent a massive expansion in territorial control beginning in the 17th century, leading
its military and allies to the Caspian Sea. The first clashes between Russians and Chechens
occurred during the First Russo-Persian when the Russian military entered the mountains of the
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North Caucasus to secure a better foothold at the Caspian Sea. There they were met by Chechen
mountain tribes that strongly resisted their incursion (Schaefer, 2011). Control over the north
Caucasus region fluctuated between Russia and Iran for the rest of the 17th century. By the turn
of the 18th century, Russia’s intent on securing a border with the Caspian Sea was solidified and
entailed successive wars against Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Despite the success of the
Russians in expanding their control over the region, they were continually met with sustained
resistance by the Chechens and other North Caucuses ethnic groups. Chechen and related
Caucasian resistance to Russian rule was so intense that by the mid-18th century, the Russian
empire looked to repopulate the region with different ethnic groups through settlement and
expulsion (Schaefer, 2011). This culminated with what is referred to as the Circassian Genocide,
which involved the ethnic cleansing of predominately the Circassian peoples but also the
expelling of many other Caucasian ethnic groups, including the Chechens. This resulted in a
massive depopulation of the region and resulted in its intended effect of easing Russian rule of
the region. Many Chechens would be sent to the Ottoman Empire due to them being Sunni
Muslims and the interest of the Ottomans for settling the Chechens in borderlands of their own
empire. At this time the Chechen population that remained in the North Caucasus would partake
in what is now referred to insurgent warfare against its Russian rulers due to the change in
demographics (Schaefer, 2011).
After several decades of solidified Russian rule over the North Caucasus, World War 1 and the
ensuing collapse of the Russian Empire in civil war led to the independence of several new
countries. Included in this would be the United Mountain Dwellers of the North Caucasus, a
newly formed state composed of Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestani territories. Officially founded
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in 1917, the newly formed North Caucasus state was started as a democracy and held official
elections (Sakwa, 2005). Despite its brief existence, it would be recognized officially by several
major states. This would come to an end with the defeat of the White Army that had been
attempting to invade the Mountain Republic by the Red Army and the takeover of the state by
the victorious Soviet forces (Schaefer, 2011). The Chechens would again resume their
generalized resistance to Russian rule, despite it occurring now under the secular Soviet Union.
Most of this resistance entailed ignoring Soviet cultural policies, such as the implementation of
Russian language learning and the secularization of Soviet society. However, despite this
chafing, Chechens and other northern Caucasus groups would participate in the Red Army’s
fight against Nazi Germany in World War 2. Despite their participation in the war effort, the
long history of resistance to Russian rule culminated in the closing acts of World War 2 with the
deportation of essentially the entire population of Chechens from their homeland to Siberia
(Sakwa 2005). A majority would die as a result of this forced movement. In 1956 the Chechen
population were allowed to return to their homes, although for many they found that ethnic
Russians now occupied where they had once lived. The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic that had existed prior to the deportation was re-established, however ethnic
Russians would dominate its bureaucracy and leaderships throughout much of the rest its
existence.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union several decades later sparked off another round of the nearcontinuous fighting between Chechens and the Russian state. While the Soviet Republics could
split off into independent countries, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was technically a part of the
larger Russian Soviet and, according to the Russian state, not under the same conditions. Despite
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this, Chechen leaders pushed for secession and established a mostly un-recognized independent
democracy. In the chaos of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the initial Russian response was
slow and ineffective. Finally, Russian president Boris Yeltsin would send in the Russian military
in 1994 to Chechnya, kicking off the first Chechen war. Despite overwhelmingly numbers and
military hardware, the Russian military would fail to maintain control over Grozny, the Chechen
capital, forcing the Russian government to declare a ceasefire in 1996. The war destroyed
Chechnya’s infrastructure and economy, with the small country completely destabilized (Vasili
and Duerr, 2016). Only three years after the ceasefire was declared, the Russian military again
mobilized into Chechnya, this time successfully taking Grozny after virtually flattening the city
through an intense aerial bombardment. While an insurgency would ensue the ending of the
second war, Chechen resistance was broken and the region has since been re-incorporated into
the Russian Federation. Not until 2009 would the Russian military remove its large presence
throughout the territory, indicative of the danger posed by insurgent forces that remain to this
day.
Security Outlook of Russia
In the contemporary, the violence that had beset Chechnya is at a low-point especially
considering the past two decades. As of this writing, Russia’s security apparatus views Chechnya
as a lower level threat and its concerns have predominately refocused into Syria and eastern
Ukraine (Zhirukhina, 2018). This does not mean that the securitization of Chechnya and the
surrounding North Caucasus region has been discontinued. To the Russian government, the
Chechen region’s biggest threat has been its ability to export fighters to other parts of the North
Caucasus, Syria, and even Ukraine (Holland, 2010). Chechen resistance, via primarily Islamist
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groups like the Caucasian Emirate and to a lesser extent secular nationalist, have been becoming
more discrete and less acceptable to operate in Chechen space. Much of the actual security
operations have been outsourced to Chechnya’s leader and Russian ally Ramzan Kadyrov
(Iliyasov, 2018). Installed in part by the Russian government when it became clear that he was
loyal to Russian interests, Kadyrov has become the face of the securitization of Chechnya. Under
Kadyrov, the number of arrests of Chechens has skyrocketed. In recent years, arrests appear to
make up the majority of engagements in the conflict, accounting for more than half of the
“conflict events” in 2015 (Holland, 2010). These arrests extend to more than just military targets.
As part of the securitization of the region, civilians are often included in mass detainments as a
means of intimidation by the Kadyrov regime (Holland, 2010). This marks a recent, notable shift
in the handling of security in Chechnya.
Russian security operations in Chechnya in the contemporary period of analysis begin with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos throughout the post-Soviet sphere. In this
chaos, Chechnya functionally realized the populations quest for independence since the 18th
century (Rukhadze and Duerr). Under the leadership of Dudaev, an ex-Soviet official, Chechnya
continually rejected any participation in the newly founded Russian Federation. As Chechnya
continued to stand firm in its question independence, Russian president Boris Yeltsin initiated a
large-scale invasion of Chechnya. The invasion initiated by the Russians was followed according
to conventional warfare tactics, with large-scale movement of Russian soldiers into Chechnya
and aerial bombardment of targets (Iliyasov, 2018). The Chechens, out-gunned and out-manned,
resorted to mostly guerrilla warfare. Russia’s pursuit of conventional warfare was perhaps
informed in part to the Chechnya, while unrecognized, being a de facto state that had
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successfully held democratic elections and had the beginnings of a functional civic society. The
First Chechen War was incredibly destructive, with the Russian military’s tactics being
indiscriminate and functionally destroying most of Chechnya’s infrastructure. Approximately
100,00 thousand Chechens would be killed in the war, with the death toll of Russians estimated
to top out at 14,000 (Rukhadze and Duerr). While the Russian military would ultimately be
defeated and forced to withdraw from Chechnya to the shock of the world, Chechnya’s capital
Gorzny was in ruins and its economy functionally nonexistent. The results of the first war would
facilitate the conditions that plague the region to this day, with formal and informal chaos pushed
to disorient the Chechen population and weaken support for resistance (Rigi, 2007).
The chaos left by the vacuum of the First Chechen War was filled with the rise of warlords and
an Islamist bent to Chechen military resistance that has colored it since then. The rise of the
violent Islamist militias also pre-empted the spread of the violence to the rest of the North
Caucasus (Holland, 2010). Chechnya’s second war was kicked off by the invasion of
neighboring Dagestan by an Islamist Chechen militia, provoking another large-scale Russian
military response. The convenience of the Islamist incursion outside of Chechnya was speculated
as being influenced by the Russian security apparatus through the FSB (Rukhadze and Duerr).
The beleaguered Chechen government did deny any involvement in the spilling over of violence
into other parts of Russia, but that fell on unwilling ears. The Second Chechen War was also
incredibly violent, this time being shorter and more targeted by the Russian military. While the
Russian military would still operate in a large capacity as it did in the first war, the second war
belied their approach to Chechnya as it employed counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism
tactics (Rukhadze and Duerr). Chechnya was finally back under the administration of Russia, but
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it required a large-scale military presence that would last through 2009 to keep the prevent the
outbreak of any large-scale resistance. Regular state functions of Chechnya existed but for all
intents and purposes the Russian military ran Republic. The pullout of the Russian military and
handover to regional and federal police forces did mean for a new phase of Russian security
policy in the region but mostly in who exactly was enacted state security policies. Russia’s
security outlook toward Chechnya has since then been focused on suppressing Chechen and
installing native Chechens to enforce these suppressive population tactics (Zhirukhina, 2018). In
the respect of quelling outward Chechen nationalist sentiment Russia has clearly succeeded in
the meantime, but it has come at a cost to the civilian Chechen population (Le Huerou, 2018).
Russia’s shift in focus on Chechen was largely a result of the 2014 Sochi Olympics. While not in
Chechnya itself, Sochi was close and offered a significant security concern due to the proximity
and the impact a successful attack on the Olympics would have for Russia’s image. The ramp up
of the policing of the Chechen population, regardless of their lack of involvement in any labeled
terrorist activities, is the tip of the spear of the securitization of Chechen life (Zhirukhina, 2018).
Under the Kadyrov regime, with assumed direction by the Russian government, Chechen social
and cultural space has become heavily scrutinized and controlled. In interviews with Chechen
immigrants in Europe, it is asserted that under that under Kadyrov, the security regime in
Chechnya is indiscriminate in who it targets (Iliyasov, 2018). In the time before and after the
Sochi Olympics, the continued bouts of violence by Islamists guerrillas indicated to the Russian
security apparatus that escalation was necessary. Russia’s security apparatus views the increasing
securitization of Chechen social space necessary considering the continued resistance of parts of
the Chechen population (Vatchagaev, 2012). In some respects, Russia’s security outlook on
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Chechnya views it necessary to change culture itself of Chechens to subdue the population.
Securing Chechnya is the key to securing the North Caucasus as a region for the Russian state.
Economic Outlook of Russia
Through the chaos of the 1990’s and the progressive stabilization of the Russia in the 2000’s,
Russia’s economic outlook has been remained. The collapse of the Soviet Union invited
economic destruction among the population and the creation of incredibly wealthy oligarchs.
Privatization was done quickly and erratically, with no delineated plan outside of the wholesale
sell-off of entire arms of the state (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). Energy production, specifically gas
and oil extraction and refinement, was always a major industry under the Soviet Union. Under
the Russian Federation it became the obvious captain of Russia’s economic policy. The opening
of the former territories of the Soviet Union to private Western companies resulted in the
discovery of the vast oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea to an extent never expected (Nanay
and Stegen, 2012). As consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian access to the
Caspian Sea had been reduced to its North Caucasus region. Russia has become the primary
transporter of oil and gas to Europe, with the vast majority being sourced from Western Siberia
despite the decreasing supplies available there (Nanay and Stegen, 2012). Due the importance of
the hydrocarbon industry to the Russian economy and the decreasing supplies available in the
Western Siberian region, securing access to the oil and gas in the Caspian Region is one of the
pre-eminent long-term economic goals. To do so is complicated not only by the interests of the
differing sovereign states in the region and the US and EU pursuing alternate routes for gas, but
also the fact that the North Caucasus is also Russia’s least stable region due to continued
insurgencies.

64

During the Soviet era Chechnya was home to a large portion of one of Russia’s only Caspian gas
pipelines through the Caucasus. Connected between Baku in Azerbaijan and Grozny in
Chechnya, it was a significant portion of Chechnya’s economy.
The pipeline was important, but as discussed earlier in the chapter, it was unknown to the Soviet
Union and the rest of the world that the Caspian Sea contained more significant gas and oil
deposits. With the independence of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, two of the Soviet Republics
responsible for a significant portion of the Soviet Union’s energy production, the North Caucasus
republics were the only option had for access to the deposits. Chechnya’s declaration of
independence presented a significant economic threat to the Russian Federation which was
already suffering dramatic economic issues. During the time of de fact independence for
Chechnya, Russian president Boris Yeltsin appointed a former Soviet oil minister to head the
Russian created Chechen government-in-exile to be installed in the presumed capitulation of
Chechnya (Meier, 1995). While Russian interests in retain Chechnya were not solely predicated
off the retention of the oil fields and pipelines, it was clear that it played an outsized role. The
ensuing war and failure of the Russian state to retake Chechnya left the pipeline essentially
unusable due to the complete collapse of Chechen infrastructure.
The failure of the Russian state shifted its economic outlook from reincorporating the Chechen
region into the state for the pipeline to its mostly continued policy of economic sidelining of
Chechnya. This began in earnest with the pursuing and creation of gas and oil pipelines in the
Caspian Region that completely bypassed Chechnya in order to restore its oil and gas production.
Even when the Second Chechen War ended Chechen de facto independence, the Russian state
consciously decided against restoring the Grozny pipeline and would establish its first bypassed
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pipelines at the turn of the century. As of this writing, the Chechnya is still home to significant
oil fields and their wells, however most are not in working order (Goble, 2018). The destruction
of the Chechen economy and their infrastructure worked to make the republic mostly dependent
on Russian state subsidy. In 2015, 81% of Chechnya’s budget was sourced from Russian federal
subsidy (Holland, 2010). This relationship has worked well regarding Moscow control over the
region, making any serious pushes for independence unlikely as long the economic relationship
goes one way. However, it is an expensive arrangement for Russia to maintain, and declining
hydrocarbon revenues have put a strain on the Russian budget (Goble, 2018). Chechnya’s leader
Kadyrov has pushed for the purchase and control of Chechenneftekhimprom, which “controls
approximately 2,000 plots of land with a total area of 7,740 hectares on which there are more
than 1,100 oil wells” (Goble, 2018). Most of these oil wells are however not in working
operation and there is little to indicate any work to change that in the near future. Despite
boasting of the purchase of the company for a couple of years, there is nothing to indicate that
Kadyrov has taken control of it, likely due to the Russian state’s reluctance to afford Chechnya
so much economic autonomy.
For a brief moment, the Russian state pursued a more economically inclined approach to dealing
with what it views as the Chechen issue. This entailed higher infrastructure investment and
higher rates of welfare to the populace. The strategy was pursued for Chechnya and the rest of
the North Caucasus, with the aim of alleviating the poor economic conditions and reducing the
levels of violence in the region. High rates of youth unemployment and poor economic prospects
tend to be kindle for sustained violence, all issues that were pronounced in Chechnya.
Medvedev, Russia’s president interspersed in Vladmir Putin’s leadership of the Russian state,

66

pursued this strategy most heavily through the “Strategy for the Socioeconomic Development of
the North Caucasus Federal District Until 2025” (Holland, 2010). Operating the North Caucasus
project as a federal district, despite retaining the Republics in the regions, was meant to better the
resources the Caucasian republics would receive. Despite the heightened economic attention
Chechnya and the rest of the region received, the general economic relationship between the
Russian state and the Chechen Republic remain unchanged. Considering the development plan a
failure, Russia has moved away from economic incentivization and pursued an explicitly
security-based approach to dealing with Chechnya and the violence that surrounds it.
Analysis
In some respects, violence is the normative status of Chechnya. This is true when examining the
history of Chechen-Russian relations, which were kicked off by warfare and continued to be
defined by violence. This history is important to understand and plays a major contextualizing
role in the analysis of Russian-Chechen relations, but what conclusion that one draws from this
history is even more important. It is not far-fetched to conclude that ethnic Chechens are simply
culturally diametrically opposed to the Russian state. With deeply held, distinct traditions and a
strong adherence to their Muslim faith, Chechens are simply too different from the Russian
Eastern Orthodox aesthetic to fit properly within a Russian state framework. While there have
historically been conflicts that emerge from these cultural and religious differences, there are
also distinct periods where Chechens were major participants in greater Russian conflicts. This is
exemplified by the participation of 50,000 Chechens in the Red Army in World War 2 (Schaefer,
2011). There is also the fact that many other ethnicities reside within the Russian Federation and
have little to no issues with the state or face similar levels of state repression. Even the rest of the
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Caucasian republics, which now face heightened state repression due to violence that emanates
from them respectively, do not have nearly the same amount of violent interactions with the
Russian state since being incorporated. Cultural differences are typically cited by those willing to
engage in a shallower understanding of the structural dynamics of an inequal relationship
between a state power and a minority inhabitant. This thinking is borderline essentialism, and
unhelpful and unscientific view of human culture.
The Russian security apparatus has been involved in Chechnya from the beginning of its
incorporation in the Russian Empire. Imperial designs were the main driver through the 18th and
19th centuries, as expanding the realm of the Russian state was a longtime goal of the empire.
Russian security-based oppression of Chechens could be considered a continual feedback loop.
Violent Chechen resistance to incorporation within the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and
now the Russian Federation has been met with military and police force repeatedly. A state
concerned with maintaining itself and setting an example for its other minority ethnic population,
is one that will use force to maintain itself. Russian leaders have long argued that Chechen
independence would be a threat to Russia due to a domino effect, invoked notably by Boris
Yeltsin in the run up to the First Russo-Chechen War (Meier, 1995). It makes up a portion of
Russia’s Caucasian border, and maintenance of a state’s borders is also often a justification for
securitization. The heavy-handed treatment Chechens have received historically by the Russian
state is so profound and extensive that it seems unlikely that the state would go to the lengths that
it does to suppress any real autonomy by Chechnya.
Despite the small size of Chechnya, it does have an important geography. Its status as border
territory for Russia is case enough for its securitization in the tenuous Caucasian region. Russia
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has significant interests in nearby Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway regions from Georgia.
However, the securitization that Chechnya has undergone historically through today cannot be
explained by this alone, especially considering that the Soviet Union and Russian Empire had
borders in the Caucasus farther south than Chechnya. Its geography plays a different role than
merely being a border state. Chechnya has always been an economically important region due to
its geography. Even before oil fields were developed in Chechnya proper, its situation near
Azerbaijan meant that it was always an important transit point for hydrocarbons for Russian use
and export as industrialization swept through Europe. Chechnya’s move for independence in the
1990’s in the most economically perilous time for the Russian state since World War 2 presented
a significant threat to the Russian economic system.
The Russian state’s security outlook is heavily occupied with Chechnya and the North Caucasian
Republics as a whole. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the longest security project that
the state has retained is that of pacifying Chechen nationalists and Islamists. The security outlook
of Russia is clearly informed in part by the need to protect and maintain the state, and Chechen
independence would undoubtedly call into question the legitimacy of the federation. However,
Chechnya’s geographic proximity to major oil and gas pipelines are arguably a more significant
factor in Russia’s continued efforts to pacify the Republic. The two major deportations of North
Caucasians, particularly Chechens in the post-World War 2 period, came as a result of the
perceived threat of their potential betrayal threatening the vital oil production taking place in
nearby Baku. Chechen de facto independence in the 1990’s, despite claims about it causing a
potential domino effect throughout Russia in minority republics declaring independence, did not
come true. There is little evidence to suggest that any other ASSR’s actively sought
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independence, and even SSR’s like Kazakhstan had initially preferred to maintain the USSR.
Chechnya’s location as a major oil pipeline transit location was likely the single most important
factor in spurring the Russian invasions of the republic and the re-integration of it within the
Russian Federation. The economically fragile and struggling Russian state could not afford the
lose its access to a major stream of state revenue. Despite the sidelining of Chechnya today
economically because of its instability, securitization of the region is still necessary due to the
geographic proximity it has to major pipelines that the Russian state relies on. In this case study
our alternative explanation for state repression of the Chechens is made apparent as a tool for the
state to enforce its economic order and does not displace our independent variable. Considering
all these factors, in the case of the Russian-Chechen relationship, our hypothesis should not be
rejected. The evidence indicates that the economic outlook of the state, specifically over its needs
for access to energy resources, necessitates for the Russian state to securitize the Chechens and
utilize the state security apparatus to oppress them.
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CHAPTER 7: CHINA AND THE MIAO

Introduction
Within China, the southwestern mountain ranges are populated by ethnically diverse populations.
These mountain ranges were long isolated from the rest of Chinese civilization, allowing for the
development of many distinct cultures that have persisted to this day. One of the most prominent
ethnic minorities found in the region are the Miao. The Miao reside in several Chinese provinces,
specifically Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong and Hainan. Miao
populations extend into other Asian states like Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar (Chen, 2009).
Guizhou is home to one of the largest populations of Miao people, with a significant portion of
the province’s population composed of Miao (Harrell, 1994). Guizhou has perhaps one of the
most ethnically diverse populations in all of China. Guizhou is a relatively poor and
underdeveloped region within China that has been more slowly developed than others through
the PRC’s economic development programs (Chen, 2009).
Recognized as one of the over fifty ethnic groups in the PRC, the Miao are composed of four
distinct groups, the Hmong, Hmub, Xong, and A-Hmao (Harrell, 1994). Many Americans would
potentially recognize the Hmong, as many Hmong immigrated from Laos to the United States
following the close of the Vietnam War (Turner, 2015). For the most part, Hmong in the United
States came from outside of the PRC in part from the lack of involvement of the PRC in the
Vietnamese War and warming relations between it and the United States. Notably, these groups
have cultural similarities and their respective languages are from the same family, however many
of these languages are not mutually intelligible (Tap, 2002). Some within the Miao communities
reject being labeled under the umbrella reference of Miao, but for the most part it is an issue with
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little consequence for the four groups that compose the Miao (Tap, 2002). While the conditions
of this minority groups are not necessarily of the highest quality, there is little tension that exists
between the PRC and the Miao population. The Chinese government often attempts to promote
Miao culture for tourist purposes, with Miao museums and folk-culture performances on display
for travelers. The Miao are renowned for their traditional regalia, known for the distinguishable
headgear and often bright, colorful fabrics worn (Kou, 2006). The differing features of the
regalia often are used as stand-in term for the group, such as the long-horn Miao. Many Miao
groups are known for their woodworking skills and are known to craft their residences almost
entirely out of wood.

Figure 1: The author with a Miao villager wearing traditional silver headgear

Source: Author’s personal photo

Like many other minorities within China, some issues between the state and the Miao do crop
up. Due to their more isolated living circumstances, many Miao do not speak Mandarin Chinese
(Chen, 2009). Communication difficulties between Han officials and Miao locals often arise as a
result. The Miao have generally a poor economic standing, although this is in line with the rest of
the population that resides in the region. Within certain provinces, such as Guizhou, minority
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populations reside in autonomous zones (Chen, 2009). These zones are often treated with a
relatively hands-off approach by the PRC, allowing for local populations to practice their culture
and continue their way-of-life mostly undisturbed.
History
For the vast majority of the Miao’s existence within the Chinese civilization’s frontier, their
relationship with the Chinese governing authority was defined by open revolt. Interactions
between the various Chinese dynastic authorities and the indigenous Miao were fraught. A
mountainous people, the Miao viewed themselves at the time as independent and chafed under
Chinese rule. As far back as the 14th century there are records of Miao rebellions against the
Ming dynasty, which were often put down at the cost of many human lives (Harrell, 1994). The
14th and 15th century consisted with sporadic small and large-scale rebellions by the Miao
population, which in turn would be met with overwhelming force from the Ming dynasty
(McMahon, 2016). As a means of population control and punishment, local governors would
sometimes have large amounts of Miao men castrated as punishment for the rebellions and
enslaved as eunuchs (Tsai, 1996). The Ming-era of Chinese-Miao relations also entailed the
beginning of colonization of the Miao inhabited regions. This colonization effort was
accompanied by large military garrisons as protections, which usually provoked violent
interactions between the indigenous Miao and the encroaching Chinese forces (Harrell, 1994).
To prevent the continued use of resources on the Miao’s frequent revolts, the Ming would
establish a form of a “border wall” to maintain their frontier against Miao tribes (McMahon,
2016).
Under the Qing, the frequency of revolts by the Miao was reduced relative to the Ming Dynasty.
Through the latter half of the 18th century, the Qing had greatly reformed its administrative
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system and in turn had reopened settlement of the Miao frontier regions (McMahon, 2016). Han
Chinese settlers exploded in numbers, and in turn began to take up much of the prime farming
land that had previously been controlled by Miao clans. The Miao were increasingly
economically precarious, and the breakdown of social norms incurred by the corrupt local
administrators and economic displacement had a social toll on the local population (McMahon,
2016). Within Miao culture there was a myth of the “Miao Kings”, mythical figures who were
supposed to return to lead the Miao to retake their sovereignty (McMahon, 2016). In the midst of
the collapse of social order, a Miao tribal chieftain “abruptly went crazy and without being aware
of it said that Heaven above was descending. He called on the Miao to assist [him] in becoming
the Miao King.” (McMahon, 2016). This single incident rippled throughout Miao villages and
prompted the Miao villagers to indiscriminately attack Han settlers in the frontier region.
Upwards of 50,000 Miao villagers would loot and attack Han villages, with the scale of
destruction so great that the Qing Dynasty was forced to draw up 180,000 soldiers to put down
the rebellion (McMahon, 2016).
The frontier nature of the Miao populated region continued to be an issue for the Qing Empire. In
the mid-19th century, tensions again flared to the point of rebellion. For approximately the next
20 years, various rebellions would rock the Guizhou province and surrounding regions (Jenks,
1994). While some of the rebellions were not ethnic in nature, for the most part they were
characterized by Miao rebel leaders leading attacks against the Qing authorities throughout the
southwest (Jenks, 1994). To the chagrin of the Qing, there success in putting down one rebellion
would often be met with another kicking off soon thereafter. Long disposed and living in the
periphery of Qing society, the Miao rebellions were likely stoked by the how little the local
population felt it had at stake relative to the potential of throwing off the yoke of Qing rule
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(Jenks, 1994). Over the course of two decades, the cost in human life and material was
tremendous in scale. One Qing official estimated that upwards of 4,900,000 people had died over
the course of the rebellion period (Jenks, 1994). In light of the rebellions, the Qing would
establish the tuntian land system as means of securing the region and mitigating Miao revolts
(McCord, 2011). Under this system, large swathes of land would be essentially rented to the
military for administration.
Through the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the tuntian system would be the defining characteristic of
the relationship between the Miao and Chinese governing authority. It would also trigger the
most recent revolt by the Miao people in 1937. With the final collapse of the Qing dynasty in the
first decade of the 20th century, much of the Miao populated southwest would fall under the rule
of local warlords as the Chinese Republic era began (McCord, 2011). Amidst the chaotic nature
of the Republic era, exacerbated by the Japanese invasion of China, little had changed in Miao
populated lands (McCord, 2011). The Japanese invasion of China would be only empowering the
local warlords over the Miao further as the Japanese used them as a cudgel against Nationalist
forces. In 1937, a revolt had been in quick development against the warlords and residual
Tuntian system (McMcord, 2011). Due to the Japanese invasion, local leaders incorporated
ejecting the Japanese from the region as part of their goals, alongside the formal end of the
tuntian system (McCord, 2011). The outbreak of the revolt would be utilized by Nationalist
forces to better their position against the Japanese and integrate the frontier Miao groups into the
general resistance movement. Eliminating the tuntian land rent system was beneficial to not only
the local Miao, but also the Nationalists who sought to centralize China (McCord, 2011). The
most recent and final Miao revolt would be also the first to be successful, ironically in large part
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due to the intervention of Nationalists forces to aid it and begin negotiations for integrating the
Miao populated provinces into the Republic (McCord, 2011).
The elimination of the tuntian system and its replacement with a normalized and locally
acceptable system of taxation finally brought the rebellious Miao frontier regions under formal
control of the Chinese state. The defeat of the Nationalist forces by the Mao-led Communist
party forces would continue the theme of integration and formalized state control over Miao
populated regions of China. Since the 1937 revolt, large-scale violence against the Chinese
authorities by Miao groups has ceased.
Security Outlook
The wide range of Miao population residence crosses several provincial borders in China. While
the bulk of the population resides in Guizhou, which is not a border province, significant
populations live on or near the Chinese border in the Guangxi and Yunnan provinces (Chen,
2009). Considering the long and violent history that the Miao have had with the Chinese state,
one would figure that there would be potentially heightened security concerns by the
government. For the most part, attempts to alleviate potential issues among the Miao community
in regard to the Chinese state have been mainly predicated on reducing cultural barriers and
expanding the scope of education in their communities (Wu, 2012). Curriculum reform in rural
Miao regions was been introduced with the intention of lowering the gap in educational
outcomes and bettering Miao community education (Wu, 2012). Education is compulsory
throughout China, but the extent of implementation varied between ethnicity and the urban-rural
divide. The “suzhi” method of education seeks to teach all Chinese citizens a similar set of
values and norms (Wu, 2012). While this is a somewhat security-oriented approach of education,

76

it is not targeted specifically toward the Miao and is instead a generalized policy meant for
country-wide normativity.
Border security is a known issue for China, as discussed within this paper extensively in the
chapter analyzing the relationship of the Chinese state and the Uyghur ethnic minority. Border
issues have been a large enough issue for China in the past that they have gone to war over it,
both with India and Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese war, starting in 1978, is of particular interest
due to Miao populations residing on both sides of the border. China’s invasion of northern
Vietnam in response to Vietnam’s ousting of the Khmer Rouge did involve ethnic minorities like
the Miao in it (O’Dowd, 2007). This involvement, at least for China, was in a supportive role.
Miao across the border were contacted to aid the Chinese military invasion of Vietnam
(O’Dowd, 2007). While the response was far from overwhelming, poor relations between the
Vietnamese government and the Miao did entail some tactic support was given by border Miao
populations to China (O’Dowd, 2007). The close of the war and the withdrawal of China left the
border technically still up for debate until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. China’s
security relationship with the Miao on the border has remained positive (Turner, 2015).
Interestingly, the finalization of the border with Vietnam has meant that both Chinese and
Vietnamese authorities have allowed for extensive cross-border interactions between the Miao
(Qian and Tang, 2017). There is an annual traditional Miao celebration, Huashan, that takes
place across the border. Neither the Chinese government nor the Vietnamese government have
issue with the large amount of undocumented border crossings that take place for the celebration
(Qian and Tang, 2017). In fact, the Chinese government is very encouraging of it. Economic
development on the Chinese side of the border has been better relative to the Miao in Vietnam,
and Chinese officials see the cross-border interactions as a way for them to show the benefits of
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Chinese citizenship (Qian and Tang, 2017). Although from a shallower analysis China and
Vietnam share similar systems of government, their respective approaches to bringing their
modernization projects to the Miao differed (Turner, 2015). For China, having in a relatively
unsecured border with Vietnam, despite the presence of ethnic minorities on that border, is a
convenient propaganda exercise.
Economic Outlook
The economic situation of the Miao in China is not a good one. High rates of poverty and poor
economic productivity from the provinces they reside in are characteristic of most Miao
populations in China (Feng, 2013). The largest population of Miao is found within the Guizhou
province, which is also one of the poorer and lesser developed provinces found throughout China
(Chen, 2009). There has been recent effort to alleviate this uneven development by the Chinese
government, although there is still many prevailing economic issues for the ethnic Miao
throughout southwestern China (Chen, 2009). Some of the lack of development comes in part
due to the difficult geographic terrain of Miao inhabited regions, with Miao villages often found
deep within forested mountain ranges. Resource-wise, the Miao populations resides in only
modestly productive lands.
One of the largest industries for the Miao is that of the timber industry. Specifically, in Guizhou,
the Miao have worked timber plots for over a thousand years (Lu, 2016). The timber industry has
played not only an outsized economic role for the Miao, but also plays a significant cultural one
as well. The Miao are well known for their woodworking abilities and building their households
out of the timber they collect. The victory of Mao’s communist forces and the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China meant that the historic forests that the Miao had tended to were
transferred either to direct state control or to collective ownership. Before the economic reforms
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of the 1980’s, about 58% of the forests throughout China were collectively owned (Lu, 2016).
With the introduction of forest reform, much of the collectively owned forests were transferred
to individual household ownership (Lu, 2016). The Chinese government viewed the transfer of
state-owned and collectively owned forests as a means for maintaining healthier forests and
economically benefiting the many minorities, particularly the Miao, who live heavily forested
areas (Lu, 2016). Following reforms announced in 2005 and implemented in Guizhou in 2007,
three forms of forest ownership models existed: state-ownership, collective ownership, and
individual household ownership (Lu, 2016). Individual household ownership forests were still
technically collectively owned, however individual households were able to exercise rights and
utilization of their resources for them.
The other most productive economic activity that the Chinese state cultivates in Miao populated
regions is tourism. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Miao are renowned for their colorful
and unique dress and rich traditions. Tourists to Miao populated regions are often solicited to
take pictures in traditional Miao wear for a small fee (Feng, 2013). The modernization project
that China has undergone has forced the formerly subsistence farming Miao communities to seek
out sources of income, and tourism quickly became a source (Feng, 2013). Much of the tourist
industry is carried out by women, although men are also participants. Provincial governors are
generally encouraging of Miao tourist activities, often facilitating the permits for Miao
performances to take place in urban centers (Feng, 2013).
Many Miao work as migrant laborers, moving to larger urban areas for years at a time to earn a
stable income (Feng, 2013). This is not an ethnic specific activity however, as rural populations
across the country engage in migrant work. For the Miao, migrant labor is usually initial wealth
building, as most will leave the cities after a few years of work with the money they have saved
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to invest in local economic activities (Feng, 2013). Despite the poorer economic situation of the
Miao, their economic lot is relatively similar to other rural populations, ethnic minority or Han,
and therefore not a source of great tension. As China’s economic plan has continued to develop,
more peripheral provinces where minorities like the Miao reside have been given increasing
attention by the state.
Analysis
Bereft of the conflict observed and analyzed in this research’s other case studies, there is a clear
delineation between this case study and the rest of the work. The Miao, a minority with an
incredibly blood historical relationship with Chinese governing authorities for several hundred
years, today have a peaceful and more hands-off existence under the PRC. This relationship was
not exclusive to just the PRC, as the relationship the Miao people established with the
Nationalists was also a positive one. Although the Nationalists sought to make China into a state
structured with a strong, universal character, the Miao had no problem collaborating with the
Nationalists to end warlord rule in the southwest and resist Japanese incursions from the coasts.
As China violently moved away from the imperial system of governance and toward a more
centralized state, the Miao seem to have benefited greatly from this shift.
Border security, as discussed previously in the chapter, has a long and significant history in the
Chinese state’s security policy. Even in the history of the Chinese-Miao relationship did border
security, albeit significantly less formal, play a belying role in the frequent violent interactions
between the Chinese and Miao. Despite this history, and examples of border security even in the
contemporary Chinese state being a security priority, the Sino-Vietnamese border is given such a
loose security policy that it is less stringent than crossing the US-Canadian border. Almost daily,
Miao on either side of the border will cross to visit, trade, and have general relations with each
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other. This positive relationship is a stark contrast to the management of the border in Xinjiang,
despite the presence of an ethnic minority that has perhaps some of the worst relationships with
Chinese rule.
In Miao populated provinces, the Miao typically reside in the most mountainous and remote
parts of said province. Although there is some mineral resource extraction that takes place, it is
far from the biggest driver of the local economies. Most importantly, there are no significant
sources of energy resources in Miao lands. Guizhou, the province that is home to most Miao,
offers little more than a modest timber industry. The existence of some mineral deposits in the
province is outweighed by the significant cost of extraction for these deposits due to the terrain.
The lack of any significant energy industry in the southwest has meant that the modernization
project China is undergoing has more lightly touched the region. Unlike peripheral provinces in
other parts of China, there is no pressing need to develop local infrastructure and industry to an
extent seen in provinces like Xinjiang. The Han population in the region has remained mostly
stable, and the high birth rate of the Miao has meant that slowly they have taken up a larger
portion of the overall population (Chen, 2009).
It is apparent that the virtual non-existence of securitization of the Miao community is in large
due to the lack of any economic incentive to do so for the Chinese state. Miao communities are
not near any hubs of energy extraction or transportation, instead tucked away deep in
mountainous communities where rice farming is still a significant economic activity. The
absence of an economic industry as valuable to the Chinese state as the energy industry is in
large part why the Chinese state has little need to securitize the Miao. In fact, the Chinese state
has found that reducing something as typically important as border security for their own benefit
in relations with the Miao and to show neighboring states the economic power of the Chinese
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state. The absence of an important economic incentive like energy extraction and transportation,
our independent variable, means for the absence of the security apparatus of the state, our
dependent variable, oppressing the Miao. Despite residing in a border region historically fraught
with instability and violence, the Miao are engaged with by the Chinese state in good faith and at
the worst with indifference. This case study is supportive of the hypothesis, as the lack of
economic incentive is shown to be the likely reason that the Miao people are not oppressed
through the Chinese security apparatus.
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CHAPTER 8: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Analysis
Table 1 Comparison of Case Studies
Security outlook of
central state

Economic outlook of
central state

Border Situation

Repression by the
state?

Uyghurs

Uyghurs heavily
securitized due to
claimed terror threat

Xinjiang site to
significant oil and gas
pipelines

Inhabit Xinjiang, a
western border region
in China

Yes

Kurds

Kurds heavily
securitized due to
claimed terror threat

Southeastern and
Eastern Turkey site to
significant gas and oil
pipelines

Inhabit Southeastern
Turkey, border region
in Turkey

Yes

Chechens

Chechens heavily
securitized due to
claimed terror threat

Chechnya formerly
host to significant oil
processing and wells

Inhabit the central
portion of the North
Caucasian border
republics in Russia

Yes

Miao

No discernible
securitization present

Southwestern region
has little economic
resources outside of
modest mineral
deposits

Inhabit several Chinese
provinces, including
border provinces of
Yunnan and Guangxi

No

Comparative
Case Studies

The ethnic minorities and their respective countries of inhabitance were picked specifically
because they were indigenous to the locales they reside in and there were clear issues of
oppression towards them. All four case studies have other minority ethnic populations that reside
in the state and a dominant ethnic population that occupy most of the state’s leadership. As the
research went on, it became evident that there were more substantial patterns associated with
three of the case studies and an indication that there could be potentially generalizable
observations that can be made. This is difficult in the political science field due to the enormity
of confounding and hidden variable due to the research being confined to human created social
structures and states. However, recurrent patterns are typically the building blocks of science
regardless of the field. In our attempt to look at the impact of a state’s security policy on ethnic
minority rights and relations similar issues facing the state and the ethnic minority reappeared in
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each case study. There are three discernible patterns that three of the studies shared: the
minorities in these countries typically populated more rural regions, they lived in border regions
of their states, and there were major resource extraction and transportation projects that went that
go through where they reside.
All four case studies in this paper had ethnic minority populations that had a significant number
of violent interactions with the central state. In China, Uyghur-related violence was intermittent
until the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990’s. Miao-related violence was commonplace up until
World War 2. Kurdish-related violence in Turkey has been prolonged since the beginnings of
Turkey. In Russia, Chechen related violence predates the existence of the Russian Federation and
even the Soviet Union. The existence of the violent resistance movements in all four of these
minority populations makes a case to analyze the security environment alone. The violence that
is associated with these minority populations and their central states is what initially piqued my
interest in studying the potential for the security apparatus to be uniquely responsible for the
oppression these groups faced. Security studies have become an increasingly important study
within political science and potentially identifying a connection between a state’s security
outlook and minorities offers important insight into their operations.
Although not initially considered, spatiality clearly played a role in the relation of the state
security apparatus and ethnic minority groups. In all four case studies analyzed, the ethnic
minority group mainly inhabits a region of the state that is generally far from major urban
centers, rural, and near or at the borders of the state. It is not especially surprising that the
proximity to borders entails interactions between the populations and the state security apparatus
as border security is a near-global issue. Minorities have often lived at the borders of state’s and
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the empires that preceded them. Sometimes they would be placed there for security, otherwise
representing the farthest reaches of control for a governing entity. The distance of the minority
populations, however, from major urban centers and the rural characteristics of them begins to
present a pattern of securitization that is economically informed, specifically in the interest of a
major industry. The states analyzed had essentially used these economic concerns to securitize
ethnic minorities. Urban areas typically are the site of the majority of capital production in an
industrialized/industrializing state. In China, the hukou system officially segregates urban and
rural populations, leaving rural populations effectively locked out to the wealth generated in
China’s cities. Xinjiang’s capital Ürümqi has been growing economically, but the native
Uyghur’s in Xinjiang compose a minority of the population in the capital. For the most part,
Turkey’s Kurds do not reside near a comparable urban area that exists in Xinjiang and Chechnya.
The stark divide between the rural and urban outcomes in Turkey is better connected to the
expulsion of many Kurds from their rural village into slums of major Turkish urban areas. Even
when residing nearer a city, Kurds are reduced to the periphery. While Chechnya does have a
majority Chechen city in Grozny, this is a somewhat recent development. Chechens have a long
history of rural residence and still many reside deep in the Caucasian mountains. During the
Soviet era, Grozny would be built up in part through the migration of numerous ethnically
Russian Soviet Citizens, splitting the population between the two ethnic groups but with
leadership always ethnically Russian. The destruction of Grozny during the Chechen Wars only
occurred after it became controlled by ethnic Chechens, a security tactic by the Russian state to
cripple Chechnya economically. Chechens, like most of Russia’s minorities, do not live near
Russia’s two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg.
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The tendency for securitized minorities to live in rural areas brings up the question of spatiality.
Typically, the most economically productive areas of a state are its urban areas. Those that reside
farther away from these economically productive centers often face worse socio-economic
conditions. The urban-rural divide, and its relation to ethnicity and race, is tackled by Antonio
Gramsci in The Southern Question. Born and raised in Sardinian, which “stood in a colonial
relationship with the Italian mainland” (Hall, 1986). At the time of Gramsci’s writing, and to this
day this can be observed, Italy was technically united but clearly divided by the urban north and
rural south. Gramsci observed that the relationship was mediated often by military force by the
northern controlled government for the maintenance of the economic situation and repression of
worker and Southern right’s movements. Gramsci’s work suggests that the spatial distance
between the analyzed ethnic minorities is a purposeful result of the state maintaining the
economically lucrative position it has in the relationship and enforces through its security
apparatus. The spatial distance between the major centers of capital production within these
states and the residency of these ethnic minorities makes for a relationship that built off
exploitation and alienation as the state hoards the economic benefits of productive economic
sectors like energy extraction and transportation.
In the case of Turkey and the Kurds, I found that the relationship between the state and minority
group was characterized by a long-running security struggle and was less economically inclined
than either the Chinese or Russian case studies. The repression the Kurds faced initially came in
large part of the reaction of nationalist Turkish forces seeking to crush any potential ethnic
resistance in light of the Treaty of Sevres. The Kurds did not, however, seek to separate from the
Turkish state initially. Kurdish bourgeoise, mostly Ottoman military officials and intellectuals,
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were mostly interested in maintaining the relationship they had with the state, similar to the
reaction in Southern Italy by the land-owning classes to Italian unification (Gramsci). Social
conditions that emerged from the old distribution of wealth and power under the Ottoman
Empire played a major role in the initial stages of ethnic conflict in Turkey.
This analysis is further informed by the findings of Charles Tilly in Durable Inequality. In all
three states observed, minorities are granted varying degrees of legal protections and autonomy.
Of all three, Turkey provides the least amount of legal recognition and protection of ethnic and
religious minorities. China has extensive references and codification of laws for ethnic minorities
in its constitution. The Russian Federation is relatively the most decentralized form of
government of the three states analyzed, wherein many ethnic minorities have their own
autonomous oblasts for them to inhabit and manage affairs in. In both China and Russia, despite
the existence of legal protections for minorities, state repression against Uyghurs and Chechens
still exists. The relationships between these central states and the ethnic minorities were built off
an inequal relationship initially, which are essentially “durable” regardless of the legal language
granting equality (Tilly, 1998). With the Miao in China, despite their poor economic standing,
there is not a stark difference in position when compared to local Han populations. As discussed
by Ted Gurr in Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, the lack of a
pressing incentive to resist Chinese rule helps explain Miao passivity when compared to the
Uyghur. This passivity is of course only possible because the Chinese state itself does view the
Miao as a risk to its energy production like it does with the Uyghur’s. In Turkey, advancement of
legal protections for Kurdish language and political participation under the AKP led government
was quickly threatened and reduced when the Kurds were successful in establishing a political
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party that was oppositional to the interests of the state. Despite newly minted legal protections,
the inequality of the relationship remained.
Securitization is one of the central issues of this research, and in three out of four case studies the
economic productivity of the regions the Uyghur, Chechens, and Kurds reside in provides the
casus belli for their securitization. This dynamic is exemplified by the record of Uyghur-Chinese
relations. Initially given a somewhat privileged position in Chinese society under the Qing
dynasty, the Uyghur were mostly left alone by Chinese authorities. There is a clear change in the
relationship when Xinjiang’s energy sector began to be heavily invested in by the Chinese state.
Only within the past thirty years, or shortly after the economic reforms of the 1980’s the PRC
underwent, did the Uyghur become an issue to securitize for the state.
The relationship between the central states and their ethnic minorities are practically colonial in
nature. Heavy resource extraction and transportation goes out of the land these minority ethnic
groups reside where the resources exist, with the infrastructure being built to direct these
resources away from the locales rather than developing them. Do to the exclusionary nature of
their relationship, the minority ethnic groups have no practical access to the capital development
their states are performing. Further contrasting from the other case studies, the Miao have
experienced some modest economic development, as emphasized by the Chinese government
with the Miao Vietnam border villages.
Conclusion
The hypothesis of this paper, if a state’s government views an ethnic minority as a potential
threat to an important economic industry, then the state will utilize the security apparatus to
repress the ethnic minority, is not rejected. Through four case studies worth of research it is
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evident that a state’s security outlook is notably impactful on the rights of ethnic minorities,
albeit it is not the animating force in this oppression. As an alternative explanation it was
assumed to have some potential effect on our independent and dependent variables, but this
research shows that the security outlook of a state cannot be justified as an alternative
explanation for the state repression of ethnic minorities. The security outlook of the states
studied did not securitize the living situations of the observed ethnic minorities due to the
consideration of them being a security issue, but instead a predominately an economic issue. The
security apparatus is a tool of the state to maintain the prevailing economic order. In some
instances this is readily apparent, as the Russian state has resisted re-developing the oil refinery
sites throughout Chechnya despite having to subsidize the majority of its budgets. In Turkey, the
oppression the native Kurds face is contrasted with the relatively warm relations between Turkey
and the neighboring Kurdish Regional Government. This defrosting of the relationship was
lubricated through the development of lucrative oil pipelines from the KRG to Turkey,
underlining the prominence of the economic outlook of the state on the status of the minorities
within them. The importance of the economic outlook of the state, in these case studies the
state’s energy production and transportation, is highlighted by the absence of securitization in the
Miao case study. Out of the four case studies, the Miao are the only ethnic minority that do not
reside in a region of their country that has economically productive industries. One would, fairly,
consider the possibility of the security outlook variable as an alternative explanation for state
repression of ethnic minorities would be best proven by the case study of the Miao. Historically
an ethnic minority that was in almost constant revolt against Chinese authorities, today the
Chinese state security apparatus is so relaxed with the population that they allow for mostly
unrestricted border travel for the Miao with a former military opponent. The economic outlook
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variable, our independent variable for this research, is therefore confirmed in its role by the
strength of the evidence in favor and the contrast provided through the absence of Miao
securitization in light of the lack of economic resources in Miao inhabited regions. The security
outlook of the states, considered our alternative explanation, is shown to be mostly little more
than something states utilize for their economic concerns. However, considering the case of the
Turkey-Kurd case study, the security outlook of a state does have some sort of impact its
economic outlook due to longstanding hostility toward ethnic minorities, albeit not enough to
justify the security outlook as an alternative explanation. Interceding variables, such as cultural
differences between ethnic groups and outside involvement of other states, likely had some effect
on the results of this research but are not prominent variables in the results to suggest that they
are significant causes for minority oppression within the three case studies where economic
incentive for the state existed. While the alternative explanation, the security outlook of a state,
was shown to not be the primary effector of the dependent variable and therefore disproven as an
alternative explanation for state repression of ethnic minorities, it still is an important aspect of
this research.
Recommendation for Future Research
There a few directions for future research that could be taken from this work. The most
significant I would argue would be a study on the spatial relations of ethnic minority groups and
capital production. This was a pattern that emerged that drew much of my attention due to the
lack of initial consideration for it. Understanding how the distances between these groups and
why they exist would be important work. Another aspect that I would recommend future
research into would doing an analysis of these minority groups and their central states from a
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colonial-perspective. It is not often that colonialism is viewed to happen within a state’s borders,
however the terms of the relationship between the ethnic minorities and appear to resemble most
closely those of imperial states and their old colonies. Parsing out what colonialism really entails
in relation to minority ethnic groups and the states they reside in, and whether it is applicable for
domestic usage, would be interesting work. In-line with the security oriented bent of this
research, researching the development of modern security apparatuses by states and how they are
used against minorities is a pressing question. Considering more modern, technologically
oriented strategies used to securitize the movement of certain ethnic minorities, how these tactics
are developed and implemented is important to understand.
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